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I. INTRODUCTION
The most alarming of all man's assaults upon the environment is the
contamination of air, earth, rivers, and sea with dangerous and even
lethal materials. This pollution is for the most part irrecoverable; the
chain of evil it initiates not only in the world that must support life but in
living tissues is for the most part irreversible. In this now universal con-
tamination of the environment, chemicals are the sinister and little-recog-
nized partners of radiation in changing the very nature of the world-the
very nature of its life.1
Writing in the early 1960s, Rachel Carson concerned herself
primarily with the impacts of DDT and other synthetic organic pes-
ticides on human health and the environment. Perhaps more than
any other person, she demonstrated the many interconnections be-
tween certain agro-industrial practices, such as pesticide use, and
widespread environmental contamination. Silent Spring was a trans-
formational book, warning of dangers that were largely invisible to
most people. As such, it was both of the moment and ahead of its
time. Indeed, many have suggested that Silent Spring provided
much of the initial spark that ignited the modern environmental
movement-a "cry in the wilderess... that changed the course of
history," according to then Vice President Al Gore.2 Today, forty
years later, much of what Rachel Carson wrote seems prescient,
even prophetic. By forcing people to look anew at the ecology of
certain industrial practices, she helped them (us) to see the new
risks and vulnerabilities emerging out of the very way in which
modern industrial society produced its food. Hers was a story about
connections and unintended consequences.
Silent Spring thus had a relevance that went far beyond the issue
of pesticides and the environmental effects of chemical-intensive
agriculture. By pointing to the persistent nature of various toxic
substances, their movement upward through the food chain to in-
habit living tissues in ever greater concentrations, and their ability
to cause significant and lasting damage to human health and the
environment (even at very small concentrations), Carson raised a
host of issues that challenged traditional views of pollution. As Si-
lent Spring made clear, microtoxicity mattered as much if not more
than gross insults to the environment. The challenges for regula-
tion were immense. During the 1963 hearings on water pollution,
1. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 6 (1962).
2. Al Gore, Introduction to RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING, at xv (Houghton Mifflin
1994) (1962).
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Senator Edmund Muskie, a leading proponent of stronger federal
environmental laws, spoke of the difficulties posed by toxic sub-
stances: "The emerging problems involving chemical, pesticide,
and radioactive wastes are filled with unknowns which need an-
swers before adequate treatment methods can be developed. Every
effort is needed, of course, to safeguard the public health and wel-
fare through effective controls until research has found these an-
swers."3 These sorts of problems were different from traditional
pollution concerns such as high concentrations of organic matter
in wastewater. Even minute quantities of toxic pollutants might
have significant and persistent adverse effects on human health
and the environment.4 Once such substances were released into
the environment they would be very difficult, if not impossible, to
clean up. Quantifying the precise risks they posed proved particu-
larly elusive. As a result, toxic pollution raised significant new chal-
lenges for the existing regulatory regime.5
3. Water Pollution Control: Hearing Before a Special Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of
the Senate Comm. on Pub. Works, 88th Cong. 1-2 (1963) (statement of Sen. Muskie, member
Senate Comm. on Pub. Works).
4. There is no generally accepted definition of toxic pollutants or toxic substances,
and individual statutes typically take a broad approach to defining such terms. The Clean
Water Act, for example, defines toxic pollutants as:
"those pollutants or combinations of pollutants, including disease-causing agents,
which after discharge and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation or assimilation
into any organism either directly from the environment or indirectly by ingestion
through food chains, will... cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, can-
cer, genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions (including malfunctions in re-
production) or physical deformations, in such organisms or their offspring."
33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(13). Such a definition could include almost any substance, given the.
fact that everything is "toxic" at some level. The basic maxim of toxicology-the dose
makes the poison-suggests the difficulties of making any categorical distinction between
"traditional" pollutants and "toxic" pollutants. That said, there does appear to be some
utility in the working distinction, embedded in both the existing regulatory system and in
tort law, that distinguishes between those substances that present a risk of serious harm to
human health and/or the environment at low levels of exposure and the panoply of pollu-
tants and substances that can be toxic at high levels of exposure. Many of these highly toxic
chemicals also have unique environmental characteristics such as long residence times and
bioaccumalative potential that further distinguish them from more ordinary forms of pol-
lution and add to the difficulties of controlling them. See DONALD G. CROSBY, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL TOXIcOLOGY AND CHEmY (1998).
5. To date, efforts to regulate toxics (in air, water, land, and food) have followed a
number of different trajectories, some of which have proceeded independently from and
others of which have overlapped traditional air and water regulation. For overviews, see
Michael Shapiro, Toxic Substances Policy, in PUB1IC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION 195-241 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990) and Robert Gottlieb et al., By Air, Water and Land:
The Media-Specific Approach to Toxics Policies, in REDUCING ToXIcs: A Nav APPROACH TO POL-
icy AND INDuSTRY DECISIONMAKING 25-57 (Robert Gottlieb ed., 1995).
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One extremely toxic compound that would have been right at
home in Silent Spring is dioxin. Made famous by the controversies
over Agent Orange and various toxic disasters such as Love Canal,
Times Beach, and Seveso, Italy, dioxin has come to symbolize the
perils of living in a world plagued by the toxic byproducts of indus-
trial society.6 Like DDT, dioxin, which is the name of a family of
some seventy-five related compounds, is an organochlorine (also
known as chlorinated hydrocarbons). The most toxic and well-
known of the dioxin compounds is 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-di-
oxin or 2,3,7,8-TCDD. When most people speak of dioxin they are
referring to 2,3,7,8-TCDD, a convention followed here.
Like other organochlorines, dioxins are extremely stable com-
pounds under most environmental conditions, with environmental
persistence measured in decades rather than years.7 These com-
pounds are fat-soluble and they bio-accumulate, which means that
their concentration in living tissues increases as one moves up the
food chain from one trophic level to another.' Today, dioxins are
found in living systems all over the world, including body tissues of
every person living in the United States.9 And although there is
ongoing controversy aboutjust how toxic dioxin is and what sort of
risk it poses, many scientists believe it may pose a health risk at
extremely small concentrations, i.e. there is no safe dose.' ° During
the 1970s, researchers labeled dioxin "the most potent animal car-
cinogen ever tested"-the "Darth Vader" of chemicals, as one ob-
server put it." Both the World Health Organization and the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services have classified dioxin
as a known human carcinogen. 12 In its most recent draft reassess-
6. See discussion infra Part II.
7. See U.S. EPA, HEALTH ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT FOR 2,3,7,8-TETRACHLORODIBENZO-P-
DIOXIN (TCDD) AND RELATED COMPOUNDS, External Review Draft, 9-6 to 9-7 (Aug. 1994)
[hereinafter EPA HEALTH ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT FOR 2,3,7,8-TCDD].
8. For a general discussion of organochlorine pollution and the associated health
and environmental effects, seeJOE THORNTON, PANDORA'S POISON: CHLORINE, HEALTH, AND
A NEW ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY (2000).
9. See EPA HEALTH ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT FOR 2,3,7,8-TCDD, supra note 7, at 9-13 to
9-18.
10. See THORNTON, supra note 8, at 57-103.
11. See MARK R. POWELL, SCIENCE AT EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS
329 (1999).
12. In 1997, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), a division of
the World Health Organization, upgraded its cancer evaluation of 2,3,7,8-TCDD from a
probable human carcinogen to the highest category- "carcinogenic to humans." See IARC
MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO HUMANS AND THEIR SUPPLE-
MENTS, VOL. 69: POLYCHLORINATED DIBENzO-para-Dioxins and Polychlorinated
[Vol. 21:345
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ment of dioxin toxicity, issued in September 2000, the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) re-classified dioxin from a
"probable human carcinogen" to "carcinogenic to humans."13 Re-
cently, attention has begun to focus on whether dioxin and dioxin-
like substances mimic certain hormones and act as endocrine dis-
ruptors-leading to a variety of environmental and health effects
that are only just beginning to be investigated (much less under-
stood) .14 Dioxin, quite simply, represents one of the more intracta-
ble environmental problems of the contemporary era.
Unlike DDT and other synthetic organic pesticides, however,
dioxin has never had any known use or benefit, thus making it
both harder to defend and, in some respects, harder to control.
Indeed, because dioxin is produced as an unintentional and, some
would argue, unavoidable byproduct of various industrial prac-
tices-waste incineration, 5 various combustion processes, 16 certain
chemical manufacturing processes (including some pesticides and
Dibenzofurans (1997), available at http://xvv-cie.iarc.fr/. In January 2001, the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services' National Toxicology Program published an ad-
dendum to its Ninth Report on Carcinogens that upgraded 2,3,7,8-TCDD from the
"reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen" to the "known to be a human carcino-
gen" category. See NAT'L ToXIcOLoGY PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
NINTH REPORT ON CARCINOGENS (2001), available at http://ehis.niehs.nih.gov/roc/
toc9.html. The new listing had been planned as part of the Ninth Report, which was issued
in May 2000, but was delayed until the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
dismissed a request for injunction to prevent the upgrade. In November 2001, the court
rejected a challenge to the upgrade brought by manufacturing interests. See Tozzi v. U.S.
Dep't of Health and Human Services, 271 F.3d 301 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that the
Secretary acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously in upgrading dioxin to the "known to
be a human carcinogen" category).
13. See U.S. EPA, ExPosuRE AND HUMAN HEALTH REASSESSMENT DOCUMENT OF 2,3,7,8-
TETRACHLORDIBENZO-P-DIOXIN (TCDD) AND RELATED COMPOUNDS, PT. III: INTEGRATED SUM-
MARY AND RISK CHARACTERIZATION FOR 2,3,7,8-TETRACHLORDIBENZO-P-DIOXIN (TCDD) AND
RELATED COMPOUNDS, 99-158 (2000) [hereinafter EPA ExPOSURE AND HUMAN HEALTH RE-
ASSESSMENT OF 2,3,7,8-TCDD, PT. III]. Polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (PCDDs),
polychlorinated dibenzofurans (PCDFs) and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) are chemi-
cally classified as halogenated aromatic hydrocarbonsDioxin is the most widely studied of
these compounds and represents the reference compound for the broader class of PCDDs,
PCDFs, and PCBs. See EPA HEALTH ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT FOR 2,3,7,8-TCDD, supra note 7.
See a/soJohn A. Moore, et al., The Dioxin TCDD: A Selective Study of Science and Policy Interac-
tion, in KEEPING PACE wrrH SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 221-242 (M. Uman ed., 1993).
14. See EPA HEALTH ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT FOR 2,3,7,8-TCDD, supra note 7, at 9-43 to
9-51. On dioxin's potential as an endocrine disruptor, see THEO COLBURN ET AL., OUR
STOLEN FUTURE 110-121 (1997) and THORNTON, supra note 8, at 85-93.
15. U.S. EPA, ExPoSURE AND HUMAN HEALTH REASSESSMENT DOCUMENT OF 2,3,7,8-
TETRACHLORODIBENZO-P-DIOXIN (TCDD) AND RELATED COMPOUNDS, PT. I, VOL. 2: SOURCES
OF DIOXIN-LLta COMPotnIDS IN THE U.S., 3-1 to 3-44 (Sept. 2000).
16. Id. at 4-1 to 7-28.
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herbicides)," and chlorine bleaching of pulp and paper' 8-con-
trolling or halting its release would effectively require abandoning
(or radically altering) such practices. Given the money involved
and the fact that these practices produce very small amounts of
dioxin, some have argued that the costs of reducing dioxin out-
weigh the benefits. 9 On the other hand, given the extreme toxicity
of dioxin and the uncertainties associated with its effects, others
have urged a precautionary approach. Dioxin, they argue, should
be presumed guilty until proven innocent.
2 °
This essay focuses on efforts to regulate and remedy dioxin con-
tamination in a specific industrial sector-the pulp and paper in-
dustry. Although the issue of dioxin contamination in the pulp and
paper industry first arose in the mid-1980s, efforts to define the
nature and scope of the problem, much less control it, continue to
this day. As with so many other toxic substances, the uncertainties
associated with dioxin science and the practice of risk assessment
have created significant opportunities for politicization. Indeed, as
the various parties affected by the dioxin issue-industry advocates,
environmentalists, plaintiffs' lawyers, government scientists and
regulators, and local communities-have pursued their various in-
terests through Congressional hearings, the tort system, and the
regulatory arena, they have created fertile ground for intense polit-
ical conflict.
By focusing on the struggle to control a specific toxic harm in a
specific industrial sector, this essay explores the politicized nature
of toxic harms in the United States and, in the process, highlights
the considerable shortcomings of existing legal regimes and insti-
tutions for dealing with problems of such scope and complexity. In
doing so, the essay raises a host of normative issues regarding cur-
rent institutional arrangements and the appropriate strategy for
dealing with toxic harms. While both tort law and the existing reg-
ulatory system will undoubtedly have a place in efforts to deal with
toxic harms, the following case study demonstrates that neither has
proven particularly adept at achieving the respective goals of com-
pensation, deterrence, and pollution control in a timely and cost-
effective manner. Such a result simply provides one more argu-
17. Id. at 8-5 to 8-45.
18. Id. at 8-1 to 8-5.
19. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
20. For a recent argument in favor of a precautionary approach with respect to orga-
nochlorines, such as dioxin, see THORNTON, supra note 8.
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ment for developing new approaches to toxic harms. While any
such effort must contend with the realities of environmental polit-
ics in the United States, this essay discusses several recent innova-
tions in environmental policy and regulation that provide a
possible basis for developing a new approach.
The essay is organized as follows: Part II provides background
information and context necessary to situate dioxin and the case
study in the broader landscape of toxic harms. Part III, which ac-
counts for the bulk of the essay, documents the story of dioxin con-
tamination in the pulp and paper industry. Part IV then provides a
discussion of major lessons from the case study and possible alter-
natives for the future.
Three main lessons emerge from the case study. First, both tort
and regulation (whether viewed as alternative responses to toxic
harms or as complementary approaches) appear to be deeply
flawed in their capacity to deal quickly with toxics problems of simi-
lar scale and complexity as dioxin. Second, throughout the dioxin
controversy, scientific uncertainty has emerged as a key site of po-
litical conflict and, consequently, a key source of inaction and de-
lay. Third, given the flaws in existing tools and institutions, any
effort to develop alternative approaches needs to focus primarily at
the level of institutional design. Rather than start from scratch, this
essay argues that there are a variety of new tools and strategies that
have emerged in recent years that might provide the ingredients
for a new information-based approach to the social control of toxic
harms.
2 1
II. SITUATING DIoxiN IN THE LANDSCAPE OF Toxic HARMs
Generalizations about toxic harms do not come easy. Aside
from the vague and general nature of the term itself,22 efforts to
distinguish among the many potential toxic harms must contend
with a multitude of different sources, pathways, exposures, human
health effects, environmental consequences, and legal and regula-
tory responses. Compounding such complexities is the pervasive
lack of even the most basic information about the vast majority of
chemicals that have been and continue to be introduced into the
21. See infra Part IV.
22. As a working definition, one might characterize a toxic substance as one that
presents a risk of serious harm to human health and/or the environment at low levels of
exposure. Such a definition, of course, inevitably begs a number of questions. What counts
as "serious" harm? What constitutes "low levels" of exposure? Who gets to decide? See supra
note 4.
2002]
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environment.23 Out of the 70,000 commercially produced chemi-
cals in circulation today (more than 11,000 of which are orga-
nochlorines), the vast majority has not been subjected to any sort
of substantial toxicity assessment. 24 Basic information on the toxic-
ity of pollutants is similarly lacking. Out of the approximately 650
chemicals covered by the Toxics Release Inventory-all of which
must have some evidence of "toxicity" to be on the list in the first
place-information necessary for safety assessments is lacking for
93% of the chemicals released to air and 66% of the chemicals
released to water.25 This striking lack of basic information points
out the practical impossibility of developing a coherent assessment
of the overall toxics problem. Indeed, no matter how sophisticated
the science becomes, we will never "know" the actual extent of
chemical contamination, much less the associated health and envi-
ronmental effects. Toxic ignorance, it seems, is a basic fact of life.
In spite of such pervasive ignorance, however, scientists and
regulators have compiled a substantial amount of information on
certain compounds. Along with asbestos, dioxin is one of the most
intensively studied compounds in the toxics area. Since the 1950s,
when some of the health effects of dioxin were first reported,
thousands of scientific articles have been published on its biologi-
cal and toxicological properties. 26 Over the last fifteen years, more-
over, EPA has conducted three major assessments of dioxin, the
most recent of which was released in draft form in September
23. See David Roe & William S. Pease, Toxic Ignorance, THE ENVrL. FORUM, May/June
1998, at 24 (documenting the general lack of basic information necessary to assess chemi-
cal safety and arguing that the current regulatory regime exacerbates the problem by re-
warding ignorance and penalizing knowledge).
24. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 458 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that "more than 70,000 chemicals now are used in pesti-
cides, food additives, cosmetics, drugs, and other commercial products. More than 1,000
new chemicals are introduced every year.") See also THORNTON, supra note 8, at 99-101
(noting that in addition to the 11,000 organchlorines in commerce, thousands more are
"produced as accidental by-products. Basic toxicity data on acute and chronic effects are
available for only a tiny fraction. For the vast majority of compounds there are no data at
all."); Roe & Pease, supra note 23, at 25-27 (noting that 71% of high-volume chemicals in
commercial use in the United States lack the minimum data necessary for health hazard
screening and that 97% of these chemicals lack the information necessary for safety
assessment).
25. See Roe & Pease, supra note 23, at 26-27.
26. See, e.g., EPA EXPOSURE AND HuMAN HEALTH REASSESSMENT OF 2,3,7,8-TCDD, PT.
III, supra note 13, at 26 (2000) (noting that "[s]ince the identification of 2,3,7,8-TCDD as a




2000.27 The more we learn, it seems, the worse it gets. 28 And yet,
despite such efforts, substantial uncertainties continue to plague
attempts to accurately characterize the risks from dioxin, creating
enormous challenges for efforts to regulate and remedy the poten-
tial harms associated with dioxin exposure.
One thing we do know, however, is that dioxin has been identi-
fied as the primary culprit in a number of important controversies
over toxic substances. In the early 1970s, for example, dioxin was
implicated in the controversy over 2,4,5-T (Trichlorophenoxyacetic
acid), the active ingredient in a number of herbicides used to con-
trol weeds in forests, range and pastureland, and along rights-of-
way.29 After an epidemiological study that linked 2,4,5-T spraying
in Oregon forests to increases in the local miscarriage rate, EPA
invoked its emergency powers under the Federal Insecticide, Fun-
gicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and suspended the registra-
tion of 2,4,5-T for use on forests and rights of way.30 Dow Chemical,
the manufacturer, quickly challenged the decision in federal dis-
trict court on the grounds that EPA's actions were arbitrary and
capricious.3 ' The court ruled in favor of EPA.12
Dioxin has also been implicated in the ongoing controversy
over Agent Orange. Widely used as a defoliant during the Vietnam
War, Agent Orange, which involved a roughly equal mixture of
2,4,5-T and another chemical known as 2,4-D, was heavily contami-
nated with dioxin and subsequently alleged to be the cause of sub-
stantial health problems among the Vietnamese population and
many American veterans.3 3 In the United States, a group of veter-
27. Id. Prior assessments were released in 1985 and 1994. The current assessment
runs to more than 3,000 pages.
28. See infra Part III.D for a discussion of the results from EPA's dioxin reassessment.
29. During the production of 2,4,5-T, dioxin is produced as an impurity. In 1970,
EPA banned the use of 2,4,5-T on all crops except rice. See RONALD BmcxmvA'a, ET AL.,
CONTROLLING CHEMICALS: THE PoLrrics OF REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
212-13 (1985).
30. See 44 Fed. Reg. 15,874 (Mar. 1, 1979) (announcing the ban). This was the first
time that EPA invoked its emergency power under section 6(c) (3) of FIFRA. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 136(c) (3) (2001). The epidemiological study was known as the Alsea II study, named for
the Alsea basin in Oregon. Details of EPA's actions are recounted in Dow Chemical Co. v.
Blum, 469 F. Supp. 892, 895-98 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
31. 469 F. Supp. 892.
32. Id (holding that EPA did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner and deny-
ing Dow Chemical's motion to stay EPA's emergency suspension orders of two dioxin-con-
taminated herbicides under FIFRA).
33. For a discussion of the Agent Orange controversy and the lawsuit it spawned, see
PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DIsASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986).
20021
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ans sued several of the manufacturers in 1978, initiating one of the
first class-action based toxic tort cases in the country. 4
In addition to contaminated herbicides, dioxin has also been
involved in a number of high profile toxic disasters during the last
several decades. The famous Love Canal incident, which resulted
in the permanent evacuation of more than 500 families, resulted in
part from dioxin contamination of local soil and water. 5 At Times
Beach, Missouri, after determining that local authorities had
sprayed dioxin-contaminated oil onto unpaved roads to control
dust during the early 1970s, the entire town was evacuated in 1982
and officially closed in 1985.36 In 1976, after an explosion at a
chemical plant in northern Italy released large quantities of dioxin
and dioxin-contaminated herbicides into the local environment,
800 people were evacuated from the neighboring township of
Seveso.
3 7
In all of these cases, however, efforts to regulate the release of
dioxin into the environment and efforts to fashion legal remedies
for the alleged harms caused by dioxin exposure have run up
against the basic fact of scientific uncertainty. The fundamental
problem, from the perspective of those who favor a more precau-
tionary approach to toxic substances, is that both the tort system
and the current regulatory framework for toxic substances and
toxic pollutants presume the availability of adequate scientific in-
formation as a basis for action- a presumption that is not very real-
istic in a world of toxic ignorance. Moreover, because the current
34. Id.
35. Between 1942 and 1952, the Hooker Chemical Company dumped more than
20,000 tons of hazardous waste into Love Canal, in New York state. The company then
covered the canal with one to four feet of soil and sold it to the local school board for one
dollar. An elementary school was built on the property, and a neighborhood grew up
around the edges. In 1976, after residents reported health effects from wastes seeping into
their basements and successfully organized to demand investigation, the state found local
soil and water to be heavily contaminated with a number of toxic substances including
dioxin. In 1978, a state of emergency was declared and more than 500 families were perma-
nently evacuated. For a discussion, see THORNTON, supra note 8, at 277 and Christopher R.
Strauss & Janet L. Scott, The Future Rewritten: The Chemical Industry and the Environmen4
CHEMISTRY AND INDUSTRY, Oct. 1, 2001.
36. For a brief discussion of Times Beach, see THORNTON, supra note 8, at 23 and
Strauss & Scott, supra note 35.
37. Within a month after the explosion, about 250 cases of the skin disease
chloracne, a sign of potentially high dioxin exposure, were reported. Fifteen years later,
mortality rates from leukemia, Hodgkin's disease, and multiple myeloma were three to five
times higher in the contaminated zone compared to the general population. For discus-
sion of Seveso and the follow-up health studies, see THORNTON, supra note 8, at 183-84 and
Strauss & Scott, supra note 35.
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institutional framework places the burden of producing the scien-
tific evidence necessary to characterize and quantify the harms as-
sociated with toxics largely on the plaintiff or the administrative
agency, industrial firms have few incentives to develop the kind of
information necessary to perform adequate risk assessments. In
fact, the very presence of ignorance and uncertainty often serves to
bolster claims by these firms that both tort law and the regulatory
system are over-compensating and over-regulating in the toxics
area.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the effort to prove causa-
tion in so-called toxic tort cases. Not only must the plaintiff show
that exposure to dioxin is capable of causing a certain illness or
class of illnesses (general causation), he must also show that he was
exposed to dioxin from a particular manufacturer or facility and
that the exposure was of sufficient magnitude to cause his particu-
lar illness (specific causation). Unlike asbestos or DES, dioxin does
not appear to have a signature disease associated with it, making it
very difficult to establish general causation. Consequently, even
though dioxin exposure might be linked to a wider variety of
health effects than either asbestos or DES, proving causation ap-
pears to be far more difficult.
Moreover, to the extent that exposure to dioxin stems from pol-
lution rather than product defect, the theories of tort liability avail-
able to dioxin plaintiffs create further difficulties."8 Assuming that
they can get past the causation problems that are endemic to any
toxics case, negligence and strict liability provide the two alterna-
tives for establishing liability for actual harm to a person, but both
have significant limits in the toxic pollution context.39 Absent a
38. Tort liability for toxic harms is far more developed in the area of products liability
than in the pollution context. Although considerable difficulties confront toxic tort plain-
tiffs in a products liability action (notably causation), the underlying theory of liability
offers a more robust and direct cause of action than the alternatives available in the pollu-
tion context. This derives in part from the significant changes in products liability doctrine
over the last several decades and the concomitant experience with massive products liabil-
ity actions involving asbestos and, to a lesser extent, products such as DES, Dalkon Sheild,
breast implants, etc. See discussion infra Part IV.A. Personal injury resulting from exposure
to dioxin was itself the subject of significant toxic tort litigation based on modem theories
of products liability in the Agent Orange litigation. See SCHUCK, supra note 33, at 26-34
(1986) (noting that the expansion of manufacturers' duty under modem products liability
doctrine provided the substantive basis for the veterans' claims in the Agent Orange
litigation).
39. Strict liability, of course, will only apply in cases where the polluting activity can
be shown to be "abnormally dangerous." THE RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519
(1977) provides that "one who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to
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showing of any actual illness, plaintiffs seeking compensation for
toxic harms from pollution can also employ emotional distress ar-
guments-claiming that the fear of future illness resulting from ex-
posure to the toxic pollutants constitutes a compensable injury-
but courts have shown little enthusiasm for this cause of action.40
Finally, trespass and nuisance, which provide the dominant theo-
ries for dealing with pollution-based harms outside of the personal
injury context, have not proven particularly robust as vehicles for
dealing with the vast and complex world of toxic pollution.4 1 In
short, as discussed further in Part IV below, the tort system is sim-
ply not suited to deal with the many challenges involved in efforts
to control potential harms associated with toxic substances such as
dioxin.
In contrast, regulation appears to hold more promise as a tool
for controlling toxic harms, but there are limits here as well. While
dioxin emissions from pulp and paper mills (to water, air, and
land) are subject to a number of potential regulations, there are
still considerable gaps and little overall coordination among pro-
grams. In theory, section 6 of the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA) gives EPA the authority to regulate almost any process that
produces dioxin upon a finding of unreasonable risk and as long as
that process is not regulated adequately under other statutes.42 In
liability for harm... resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care
to prevent the harm." In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, section
520 lists six factors for consideration: (1) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm
to the person, land or chattels of others; (2) likelihood that the harm that results from it
will be great; (3) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (4)
extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (5) inappropriateness of the
activity to the place where it is carried on; and (6) extent to which its value to the commu-
nity is outweighed by its dangerous activities.
40. Much of the existing case law requires some form of physical manifestation of
disease before allowing recovery for emotional distress. See, e.g., Metro-North Commuter
RR. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997) (summarizing much of the common law in the
area and holding that a railroad worker negligently exposed to asbestos could not recover
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for negligently inflicted emotional distress un-
less and until he manifests symptoms of a disease). But cf Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 863 P. 2d 795 (Cal. 1993) (allowing for recovery of damages for fear of cancer absent a
physical manifestation, if the plaintiff can show exposure due to defendant's negligence
and that plaintiff is more likely than not to develop cancer as a result of the exposure).
41. For an overview of trespass and nuisance, see MARc A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L.
RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATrvE: CASES AND MATERIALS 652-78 (7th ed. 2001). See also
Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54 ALA. L.
REv. 189 (1990); AndrewJackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors: Using Nuisance Law to
Affect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENVrL. L. 403 (1997).
42. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605 (2001). Although TSCA is generally presumed to apply
only to substances produced for commercial purposes, the scope of section 6 is quite
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practice, TSCA has proven to be severely limited as a tool to regu-
late toxic substances.43 The Clean Air Act's National Emission Stan-
dards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) program explicitly
lists dioxin as a hazardous air pollutant and, consequently, imposes
mandatory technology-based standards.' Similarly, the Clean
Water Act lists dioxin as a toxic pollutant subject to best available
technology effluent standards for point sources.45 Dioxin is also
subject to regulation under the impaired waters listing process and
total maximum daily load (TMDL) program embodied in § 303
and § 304 of the Clean Water Act.46 Dioxin and wastes containing
dioxin (such as dioxin-laced sludges from pulp and paper mills)
are listed as hazardous wastes under § 3001 of the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and thus subject to the full
panoply of RCRA regulations regarding the generation (§ 3002);
transport (§ 3003); and treatment, storage, and disposal (§§ 3004-
05) of hazardous wastes. 47 Given its listing as a hazardous waste
under RCRA, a toxic pollutant 'nder the Clean Water Act, and a
toxic air emission under the Clean Air Act, any "release" or
"threatened release" of dioxin from a "facility" is potentially subject
to liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).48 Since October 1999,
dioxin and dioxin-like compounds have also been subject to the
reporting requirements under the Toxics Release Inventory
(TRI) .49 Finally, the EPA has recently consolidated several new air
and water rules for dioxin and a handful of other toxic pollutants
broad, referring to "the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or dispo-
sal of a chemical substance or mixture." 15 U.S.CA. § 2605(a) (2001).
43. The Corrosion Proof Fittings case, which overturned EPA's asbestos ban under
TSCA, had a chilling effect on EPA's use of TSCA to regulate broadly in the toxics area. See
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). As of 1998, EPA had taken
regulatory action under TSCA § 6 against only five chemicals or chemical classes. See Roe &
Pease, supra note 23, at 29.
44. These technology-based standards focus on reducing listed emissions from major
sources in designated industrial categories. The NESHAP program is codified as § 112 of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.CA. § 7412 (1999).
45. See § 307 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1317 (1999).
46. Briefly, these regulations require that states develop lists of waters that do not
meet the water quality standards under § 303 in spite of point source control measures;
identify major point sources of water quality impairment; establish TMDLs of specific pol-
lutants for the impaired waters; and allocate the TMDL among the various contributing
sources. See 33 U.S.CA. §§ 1313-14 (2001).
47. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6921-25(1999).
48. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601 et. seq. (1999).
49. See Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic Chemicals, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,665 (Oct. 29,
1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372). TRI is codified formally as §313 of the Emer-
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from pulp and paper production into the so-called "cluster rule"-
the agency's first attempt at sector-based multimedia regulation."
There appears to be no shortage, then, of statutory law covering
dioxin emissions from pulp and paper production. And although
these various statutes are founded upon a number of different de-
sign principles-balancing risks and benefits, economic and tech-
nological feasibility, protection of public health, and information
disclosure-the actual content of the rules and regulations
promulgated to implement these statutory directives are often
based on principles of cost-benefit balancing. As Cass Sunstein has
recently argued, the basic cost-benefit calculus has come to provide
a set of default principles for federal environmental regulations. 1
Whereas the first generation of debate over environmental regula-
tion focused largely on the desirability of using cost-benefit princi-
ples as the basis for regulation, the second generation, having
accepted cost-benefit balancing as the default principle, is now fo-
cused on the
difficult questions about how (not whether) to engage in cost-
benefit analysis-how to value life and health, how to deal with
the interests of future generations, how to generate rules of
thumbs to simplify complex inquiries, how to ensure that agen-
cies do what they are supposed to do, how and when to diverge
from the conclusion reached by cost-benefit analysis, how to de-
termine the roles of agencies and courts.52
gency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 11023
(1999).
50. For a discussion of the cluster rule, see discussion infra Part III.D.
51. Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MIcH. L. REv. 1651 (2001). Sun-
stein speaks of an evolving federal common law of regulatory policy and cost-benefit analy-
sis emerging out of the interactions between regulatory agencies and the courts (primarily
the DC Circuit). Id. at 1655. In effect, as agencies labor to interpret statutory ambiguities,
they often import cost-benefit principles-a move that is heavily encouraged by the courts.
Sunstein thus interprets the recent Whitman v. Amefrican Trucking, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), as a
case where the statutory directive clearly and unambiguously required that national ambi-
ent air quality standards be set without regard to cost. Id. at 1682-85. In his view, this repre-
sents an endorsement of the general use of cost-benefit balancing in cases of statutory
ambiguity: "American Trucking is best taken not to question the cost-benefit default princi-
ples, and indeed the most reasonable reading of the opinion is that the Court has explicitly
embraced that principle." Id. at 1685.
52. Id. at 1655-56. Sunstein notes, however, that these cost-benefit principles are
quite abstract and general, and that the courts and the agencies have done little to make
them more concrete. He suggests that the best practices being developed by the Office of
Management and Budget in this area represent an important step toward a more opera-
tional approach and concludes that it is precisely in this area "that a great deal of law will
be made in the next decades." Id. at 1698. In his view, these principles are crucial to sensi-
ble and effective regulation: "Suitably specified and understood, the cost-benefit default
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The basic problem confronting cost-benefit balancing in the
toxics area, of course, is the lack of even minimal information nec-
essary to perform the balancing in the first place-a fact that trans-
lates directly into a need for improved risk assessment. In other
words, to the extent that the cost-benefit calculus does provide a
set of default principles for designing regulatory initiatives for toxic
substances, risk assessment emerges as the central focus of atten-
tion and contestation. In the context of dioxin regulations, as the
following case study demonstrates, this has been abundantly clear
in the conflict over EPA's extensive, decade-long assessment of the
health and environmental risks associated with dioxin. Although
not part of any formal regulatory program, the dioxin risk assess-
ment has played a decisive role in shaping the debate over dioxin
regulations in the pulp and paper industry. In the process, the irre-
ducible scientific uncertainties associated with any effort to quan-
tify the risks posed by toxic substances have come to provide fertile
ground for intense political conflict.
III. DioxIN CONTAMINATION IN THE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY
The following case study traces the story of dioxin contamina-
tion in the pulp and paper industry. As one of the most visible and
contentious pollution-based toxics issues that has arisen in the last
several decades, the dioxin story provides considerable insight into
how the current system deals (or fails to deal) with toxic pollutants
and how it might be improved going forward. The case study pro-
ceeds in more or less chronological fashion, focusing on efforts to
define the nature and scope of the problem, the concomitant
struggle over dioxin science, the failed attempt by tort lawyers to
turn dioxin contamination from the pulp and paper industry into a
toxic tort bonanza, and the ongoing efforts by federal regulators to
develop a coherent risk-based regulatory response to the problem.
A. Defining the Problem
The issue of dioxin contamination from pulp and paper manu-
facturing arose rather unexpectedly in the mid-1980s during EPA's
National Dioxin Study."3 This study, undertaken in the wake of the
principles should be regarded not as a technique for stalling desirable regulation, but as a
pragmatic effort to ensure that regulations respond to serious problems rather than to
trivial or imaginary ones." Id at 1716.
53. The study was formally released in 1987. See U.S. EPA, NATIONAL DIOXIN STUDY -
REPORT TO CONGRESS (1987) [hereinafter NAT'L DIOXIN STUDY].
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chemical disaster at Times Beach, Missouri, detected surprisingly
high levels of dioxin concentrations in fish living in several streams
that were supposed to serve as reference or background (i.e., un-
contaminated) streams for the study.54 Upon closer inspection, re-
searchers determined that all of these contaminated reference
streams were receiving wastewater effluent from bleaching pulp
and paper mills.5 5 In the words of one EPA official, "[a] major un-
anticipated finding of the National Dioxin Study was the presence
of dioxin in fish that were not downstream of already known dioxin
sources. A review of the data indicated a close association between
the elevated fish dioxin levels and wood pulping facilities."56
In a follow-up study of twenty-two pulp and paper mills in Wis-
consin, Minnesota and Maine during late 1985, EPA detected di-
oxin in Wastewater sludge samples.57 Agency scientists hypothesized
that dioxin was being formed as a by-product during the bleaching
of wood pulp with chlorine and chlorine derivatives.5 8 To test this
hypothesis, EPA, in cooperation with the American Paper Institute
and the National Council for Air and Stream Improvement (an or-
ganization sponsored by the paper industry), performed a study of
five bleaching pulp mills (the "five mill study") during the second
half of 1986.5' The findings were not encouraging. According to
one EPA official, "dioxins and/or furansP0 were found in the efflu-
ents of four of the five mills, the pulps of all five mills, and the
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Dioxin Contamination of Food and Water: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and
Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 159 (1988) [hereinafter Di-
oxin Contamination Hearing] (Statement of Charles L. Elkins, Director of EPA's Office of
Toxic Substances). Measured background levels of dioxin in fish were 0-2 parts per trillion
(ppt). Dioxin concentrations of more than 50 ppt were found in fish in a Wisconsin reser-
voir and concentrations of up to 85 ppt were found in samples from Maine and Minnesota.
See POWELL, supra note 11, at 367 n.3. According to the Toxicological Profile for Chlorin-
ated Dibenzo-p-Dioxins (CDDs) from the Agency for Toxic Substances and Diseases Regis-
try, the FDA recommends against eating fish and shellfish with levels of 2,3,7,8,-TCDD
greater than 50 ppt. See AGENCY FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, TOXICOLOGI-
CAL PROFILE FOR CHLORINATED DIBENZO-P-DIOXINS (1998), available at http://vw.atsdr.
cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp104.html.
57. Dioxin Contamination Hearing, supra note 56, at 159.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 160.
60. Furans or polychlorinated dibenzofurans (PCDFs) are a set of related compounds
that have a similar structure to dioxin. See EPA ExPosuRE AND HuMAN HE.LTH DIOXIN
REASSESSMENT FOR 2,3,7,8-TCDD, PT. III, supra note 13, at 3-4.
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wastewater treatment plant sludges of all five mills."61 This pro-
vided compelling evidence in support of the conclusion that the
chlorine bleaching process used in certain pulp and paper mills
did, in fact, produce dioxins and dioxin-like compounds.
62
Word of EPA's findings soon reached members of the environ-
mental community. They were not pleased, and some suspected
that the agency was not disclosing all that it knew about the issue.
In August 1986, Greenpeace activist Carol Van Strum filed a Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA) request for EPA documents relat-
ing to the National Dioxin Study.63 The following January a letter
written by an EPA official to the American Paper Institute (API)
was leaked to the press. It suggested that EPA would notify the in-
dustry in the event of any FOIA requests and would not release any
results until publication of the five-mill study.64 Van Strum and
others began to suspect collusion between the agency and the in-
dustry. In August 1987, Van Strum, along with Greenpeace col-
league Paul Merrell, released a report on the issue that pointed to
the suspected connection between dioxin and pulp and paper pro-
duction and, among other things, accused EPA of attempting a
cover-up. 65 One month later EPA officially released its two-year Na-
tional Dioxin Study, confirming publicly that dioxin contamination
from chlorine bleaching at pulp and paper mills was a potential
problem.66 The study suggested that small levels of dioxin might
turn up not only in wastewater discharges from bleaching mills
(and the fish downstream) but also in the residual sludges left over
from wastewater treatment (which were sometimes used to fertilize
nearby croplands), in air emissions, and in the actual product it-
61. Dioxin Contamination Hearing, supra note 56, at 161 (Statement of Charles L.
Elkins).
62. Id. Part of the reason for the "unexpected" nature of this discovery stemmed from
the fact that dioxin formation was (and is) only partially understood. Moreover, the tech-
nology capable of measuring concentrations at the ppt level was not widely available until
this time. Information on EPA's efforts to develop analytic techniques for detecting dioxins
in waterways during this time is contained in Water Programs, Guidelines Establishing Test
Procedures for the Analysis of Pollutants, 56 Fed. Reg. 5,090 (Feb. 7, 1991). EPA adopted
an updated set of techniques for dioxins in 1997 that lowered the measurable range of
minimum levels of dioxins into the low parts per quadrillion (ppq) range for aqueous
samples. See id.; EPA Method 1613, Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 48,394 (Sept. 15, 1997).
63. See Van Strum v. U.S. EPA, 680 F. Supp. 349, 350 (D. Or. 1987) (discussing Van
Strum's efforts to secure access to EPA documents related to the National Dioxin Study)
64. PowELL, supra note 11, at 353.
65. See PETER MERRILL & CAROL VAN STRUM, No MARGIN OF SAFETY. THE NEED FOR
EMERGENCYACTION TO REDUCE DIOXIN FROM THE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY (1987). See also
PoWELL, supra note 11, at 353.
66. See NAT'L DIOXIN STUDY, supra note 53.
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self. Indeed, one of the implications of the five-mill study, which
found traces of dioxin in the pulps produced at all five mills, was
that dioxin might also end up in the consumer products made
from these pulps.
67
Already aware of the possibility of widespread dioxin contami-
nation and seeking to prevent a full-scale public relations disaster,
the industry came out with its own findings that did, in fact, indi-
cate trace amounts of dioxin in certain consumer products.68 Not
surprisingly, the prospect of dioxin-laced diapers and milk cartons
created a media frenzy. In September 1987, the New York Times
broke the story with a front-page article headlined: "Traces of Di-
oxin Found in Range of Paper Goods."69 Here was a possible path-
way for dioxin to migrate into the human body-part of the
reason, perhaps, why virtually all Americans had detectable levels
of dioxin in their bodies.7' As Dr. Ellen Silbergeld, a toxicologist
from the Environmental Defense Fund, noted: "people clearly are
getting exposed to and absorbing dioxin .... I think we are facing
a national health problem.'
Red Cavaney, President of the API, responded that although
there was no evidence to support the claim that these "trace levels"
of dioxin in paper products posed a threat to human health, the
industry would continue to study the problem. 72 He also pointed
out, however, that "there [was] no readily apparent solution to the
problem. '73 EPA effectively agreed with API, ruling out public
health risks from using paper products. According to the agency,
however, dioxin contamination in pulp mill effluent and waste-
water sludge did represent a potentially serious problem that
would require more study and might entail significant regulatory
action.74
The whole issue clearly had ominous implications for the indus-
try and, more importantly, for the communities in which they oper-
ated.75 Pulp and paper industry representatives, of course, had
67. U.S. EPA, U.S. EPA COOPERATIVE DIOXIN SCREENING STUDY (1988).
68. Philip Shabecoff, Traces of Dioxin Found in Range of Paper Goods, N.Y. TiMES, Sept.







75. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the dioxin controversy was at its
peak, there were 104 bleaching mills throughout the country. See U.S. EPA, SUMMARY RE-
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long maintained that the air and water pollution generated by
their mills was not toxic and did not pose health hazards. As Wil-
liam H. Chisholm of the American Pulp and Paper Association put
it during the 1963 hearings on water pollution: "I want to point out
here that pulp and paper mill wastes are organic in nature and
completely nontoxic. They present no threat to human health."76
By the mid 1980s, things had changed. Once industry leaders
realized they had a potential dioxin problem, they mounted a swift
and vigorous campaign to shape the public's perception of the is-
sue. According to a series of internal documents from the API that
Greenpeace made public in 1987,77 the API developed an elabo-
rate "Dioxin Public Affairs Plan" upon learning of EPA's findings
regarding dioxin contamination in pulp mill effluent. 78 "That was
not an issue we wanted to leave to chance," noted Carol Raulston,
vice president for government affairs at API, when asked about the
industry plan.79 In pursuing its strategy, API hired a Washington
public relations firm, trained corporate executives in how to ad-
dress the issue, and conducted consumer surveys.8 0 The trade asso-
ciation also targeted the EPA for "intelligence gathering" and
developed a set of objectives whose overall goal was to convince
EPA to "rethink" its dioxin risk assessment and to decouple pulp
mill dioxin contamination from any sort of threat to public health
and the environment.8 1 Red Cavaney, the president of API, noted
in one memo to his executive committee that the organization's
reason for getting involved in the joint five-mill study with EPA was,
in part, to "forestall major regulatory and public relations difficul-
PORT ON U.S. EPA/PAPER INDusTRY COOPERATIVE DIOXIN STUDY. THE 104 MILL STUDY
(1990).
76. Water Pollution Control and Abatement (Part IA-Nat'l Survey). Hearing Before a Sub-comm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 88th Cong. 682 (1963). (Mr. Chisholm washalf right-dioxin is an organic (i.e. carbon-based) compound, but like DDT and many
other organic compounds, it also happens to be extremely toxic.)77. These documents were allegedly sent to Carol Van Strum from an anonymoussource with access to API records. SeeVan Strum v. U.S. EPA, 680 F. Supp. 349, 351 (D. Or.
1987).
78. See Michael Weiskopf, Paper Industy Campaign Defused Reaction to Dioxin Contamina-tion, WASH. PoST, Oct. 25, 1987. See also Dioxin Pollution in the Pigeon River, N.C. and Tenn.:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transp.137-40, 228-327, 100th Cong. (1988) [hereinafter Pigeon River Hearing] (statement ofGreenpeace representative Carol Van Strum and various EPA, API, and court documents(including depositions) included with her statement supporting her claims of collusion
between EPA and the API).
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ties."8 2 By developing relationships with people in the agency,
working through "selective" congressional contacts, and marshal-
ling a small army of outside experts, API hoped to shape EPA's
approach to the dioxin issue, particularly in the area of risk
assessment.
83
For a major consumer products industry facing a potential pub-
lic relations disaster of massive proportions, API's strategy made
perfect sense. Whether the strategy actually significantly shaped
EPA's approach to the dioxin issue is difficult to know. The federal
judge who heard Carol Van Strum's Freedom of Information Act
suit against the EPA in 1987 seemed to think so. In reviewing some
of the EPA and API documents submitted to the court by Van
Strum, the judge concluded that "[t] he documents appear to sup-
port the existence of an agreement between EPA and the industry
to suppress, modify or delay the results of the joint EPA/industry
study or the manner in which they are publicly presented."
8 4 At the
very least, the whole episode worked to further politicize the issue,
creating even more distrust among certain environmental groups
and the public for the industry and EPA.
In the midst of the ongoing media frenzy and legal battles sur-
rounding the revelations, EPA began coordinating with the 
API
and the National Council for Air and Stream Improvement to con-
duct a larger study of all bleaching pulp mills in the country. The
"104 mill study," as it was known, began in the summer of 1988 and
was funded entirely by the industry.
85 The study would, it was
hoped, provide a definitive picture of the extent of the dioxin
problem.
As the study was getting underway, however, it also became
wrapped up in a consent decree that EPA was negotiating with the
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the National Wildlife
Federation (NWF). Seeking to end a five-year lawsuit brought by
these environmental groups, the agency agreed in July 1988 to
carry out a comprehensive assessment of dioxins and furans in was-
tewater effluent, residual sludges, and pulp and paper products
from all bleaching pulp mills in the country.
8 6 The 104-mill study
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Van Strum v. U.S. EPA, 680 F. Supp. 349, 351 (D. Or. 1987).
85. The study was to be completed by spring 1989. See Dioxin Contamination 
Hearing
supra note 56, at 162-63 (statement of Charles L. Elkins).
86. The 1988 consent decree that EPA signed came out of a lawsuit filed 
by EDF and
NWF against EPA in 1985 after EPA denied a citizens petition filed under the 
Toxic Sub-
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was now part of a court-imposed agreement.87 More importantly,
EPA also agreed to propose dioxin regulations by April 1991. This
specific regulatory proposal eventually became part of a larger set
of rules regarding water effluent standards and national emissions
standards for hazardous air pollutants from pulp and paper mills
that has subsequently come to be known as the "cluster rule."88
Thus, the consent decree not only increased the pressure on EPA
(and the industry) to conduct a comprehensive study of dioxin
contamination from pulp and paper mills, it also set a timeline for
developing appropriate regulations. The regulatory wheels were
starting to turn.
And then the hearings began. Just as EPA was working out its
consent decree and launching the 104 mill study, the House Sub-
committee on Water Resources convened hearings at the request
of Tennessee representative James Quillen on dioxin contamina-
tion in the Pigeon River, which runs through western North Caro-
lina and eastern Tennessee. 9 But instead of focusing on the source
of the dioxin contamination in the Pigeon-the Champion Inter-
national mill at Canton, North Carolina-Quillen and others di-
rected the bulk of their attention (and anger) to EPA and the
agency's supposed mishandling of the situation. Although Cham-
pion was almost certainly the source of dioxin contamination, rep-
resentatives in Congress and from the community felt that EPA
bore primary responsibility for failing to protect public health and
the environment. This animosity toward EPA stemmed both from
the years of frustration among Tennessee residents and politicians
regarding the pollution of the Pigeon River and from the allega-
tions then coming to light regarding EPA's relationship with the
stances and Control Act (TSCA) requesting that EPA regulate dioxins and furans from all
known sources. See EDF v. Thomas, 657 F. Supp. 302, (D.D.C. 1987). At the time, bleaching
pulp mills were not recognized as a source of these substances. By the time of the consent
decree, of course, bleaching mills had been identified as a source of dioxins and furans,
hence the requirement that EPA conduct the 104 mill study. The consent decree also
required that EPA propose regulations under TSCA to control the disposal of pulp mill
residual sludges and under the Clean Water Act to deal with discharges of dioxins and
furans into surface waters. See POWELL, supra note 11, at 330.
87. See PoWELL, supra note 11, at 330-31
88. For discussion of the cluster rule, see infra Part III.D.
89. Allegedly caused by the Champion International mill at Canton, N.C. and prima-
rily affecting downstream residents in Tennessee, the dioxin issue in the Pigeon emerged
out of a larger dispute concerning water pollution between the states of North Carolina
and Tennessee, Champion International, and the EPA. For a detailed history, see RICHARD
A. BARTrT, TROUBLED WATERS: CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL AND THE PIGEON RIVER CON-
TROVRSY (1995).
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paper industry and its stance on the dioxin issue. With such feel-
ings of distrust permeating the hearings, there was little hope for
balanced discussion.
In his opening remarks at the hearings, Representative Quillen,
whose district included the Pigeon, charged that
the Environmental Protection Agency, has failed to discharge its
duty. It has failed in its responsibility to protect our citizens and
our river. This is why I asked for today's hearing, to get some
answers to serious questions which have been raised, and which
continue to be raised, about EPA's handling of this distressing
situation.90
Don Sundquist, another Congressman from Tennessee, weighed in
with equal vehemence:
I want to know... why EPA has allowed [this] tragic environmen-
tal problem to escalate to obscenely hazardous proportions. It
seems to me that EPA should have long ago been monitoring the
water quality of the Pigeon River. It could have prevented the
excessive, lethal, toxic pollution found in the Pigeon River
today.91
EPA, of course, had only been aware of the potential for such a
problem since 1985, and had only confirmed the presence of di-
oxin in the Pigeon in April 1988, three months prior to the hear-
ings.92 To suggest that it could have acted to prevent the problem
smacked of political posturing.
Still, given the revelations of the agency's cooperation with the
paper industry on the dioxin issue, suspicions of agency foot-drag-
ging and a certain pro-industry bias may have been justified.
Others who testified at the hearing, such as Carol Van Strum of
Greenpeace, provided damaging testimony regarding EPA's rela-
tionship with the API, bolstering earlier claims of agency miscon-
duct. In her view:
EPA's handling of the pulp mill dioxin problem should be viewed
in light of its traditional behavior: Leaked American Paper Insti-
tute documents . . . show that collusion remains the norm be-
tween EPA dioxin regulators and regulated industries .... EPA's
dioxin regulatory program is paralyzed and has been from the
very beginning .... More lives are at stake than just the lives of
those who live near the Pigeon River.
93
90. Pigeon River Hearing supra note 78, at 4.
91. Id. at 3.
92. See discussion of National Dioxin Study, supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
93. Pigeon River Hearing, supra note 78, at 139-40. See also the various EPA, API, and
court documents included with Van Strum's statement supporting her claims of collusion
between EPA and the API. Id. at 228-327.
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For their part, EPA officials attempted to remind participants at
the hearing that EPA had only recently become aware of dioxin
contamination from pulp and paper mills, that North Carolina and
Tennessee still retained primary responsibility for issuing discharge
permits to mills such as Champion's, and that the so-called "collu-
sion" between the agency and the API was little more than coopera-
tion aimed at reducing the costs and time delays that would have
burdened EPA if it had pushed ahead without such cooperation.94
Representatives from the area were not persuaded. Jerry Cleven-
ger, chairman of Tennessee's Cocke County Commission, left little
doubt about his own feelings:
We are beginning to have serious doubts about the integrity of
the Environmental Protection Agency.... The EPA has a man-
date to protect the environment, not to compromise the beauty
and cleanliness of any waterway, including the Pigeon River ....
Several experts contend, and we believe, that allowing the contin-
uous dumping of dioxin into the Pigeon River will constitute a
death sentence for people who live along or nearby the river.95
Jerry Wilde, president of the local Dead Pigeon River Council,
charged that EPA's compromise with Champion represented more
proof of the company's eighty-year license to pollute:
Over 80 years ago, the Pigeon River was sold to the highest bid-
der. Are people's health and welfare now being sold to the high-
est bidder? I call on you, members of Congress and of this
committee, to ensure that the EPA does, in fact, protect our envi-
ronment for us and our children and to see to it that the truth
can no longer be hidden from the people.96
While the bulk of the criticism at the hearing was directed at
EPA, Champion also received some harsh words. As Tennessee rep-
resentative Quillen pointed out,
it needs to be understood that the pollution of the Pigeon River
began when the Champion Paper Co. started up its mill opera-
tions in Canton, NC, along the river 80 years ago. Since that time
down to the present, this once lovely and sparkling clean moun-
tain river has been transformed into a foul-smelling, foaming,
sludge-filled mixture that looks like oily coffee and stinks like rot-
ten eggs. This is how Champion makes its money .... What.we in
Tennessee are ... demanding is that the Champion Paper Co.
begin at long last to operate its Canton mill in a manner which
does not continue to grossly pollute the Pigeon River and in a
94. See generally the testimony, statements, and questioning of EPA officials Bruce Bar-
rett and Martha Prothro in Pigeon River Hearing, supra note 78, at 9-77.
95. Id. at 81.
96. Id. at 329.
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manner which does not dump dioxin and other dangerous toxic
compounds and chemicals into the river. We simply do not ac-
cept the destruction of the river and the present public health
crisis as a routine part of the mill's operation."
Bob Seay of the Newport/Cocke County Chamber of Commerce
expressed similar outrage:
Champion International Corp. has long ignored Appalachia. Mr.
Andrew C. Ziegler, president of Champion International Corp.,
your day has come. The people have spoken. No longer will
Cocke county tolerate your corporate behavior .... Don't at-
tempt to hide behind the American Paper Institute or the EPA
.... Cocke County says be a credible corporate citizen. Let the
Pigeon live.9"
Representatives from Champion and from the API claimed in re-
sponse that they were surprised by the high levels of dioxin found
in the Pigeon River, emphasizing that their "industry [had] always
been mindful of its environmental and health responsibilities."
9 9 In
addition, they pledged to continue cooperating with EPA on the
dioxin issue."10 Soon they would be facing a massive class-action
lawsuit.' 0 ' In the meantime, dioxin became a full-blown national
obsession.
Indeed, less than six months after the Pigeon River hearings,
Representative Henry Waxman of California convened his own set
of hearings on the dioxin issue. 112 Referring to dioxin as "one of
the most toxic chemicals ever created,"1 °8 Waxman spoke of the
fear spreading among the American public regarding the unseen
dangers in consumer products: "Every day, it seems, we learn that
something else causes cancer or is detrimental to our health. Now
we l6arn that the dread chemical of Agent Orange and the chemi-
cal that forced the abandonment of Times beach, MO, is in baby
diapers and milk cartons."'0 4 Waxman pointed to other pathways
of contamination as well:
Valuable farm lands and the crops grown on them are contami-
nated with dioxin from the use of pulp mill sludge as a soil sup-
plement. Fish downstream from pulp and paper mills are
97. Id. at 5.
98. Id. at 353. See also other statements from local citizens. Id at 328-71.
99. Id. at 371-72.
100. See generally the testimony and statements of Red Cavaney, President of API
and Richard Diforio, vice president at Champion. Id. at 371-98.
101. See infra Part III.C.
102. See Dioxin Contamination Hearing, supra note 56.




contaminated with dioxin flushed from mills during the manu-
facturing process. Concern is raised for those working in pulp
and paper mills. While I understand there is continuing scientific
disagreement over some characteristics of the dioxin risk, I do
not believe anyone would argue that avoidable exposure to di-
oxin is acceptable .... So the question is being asked: Can we
avoid exposure to the dioxins formed in pulp making and paper
bleaching? Can the process be changed?I 05 .
Members of the environmental community argued that the pro-
cess could in fact be changed, that alternative bleaching proce-
dures existed which could greatly reduce or even eliminate dioxin
formation during pulp and paper making. The problem, in their
view, rested largely with EPA's approach to the issue. Dr. Ellen
Silbergeld from the Environmental Defense Fund, who was also a
member of an expert panel convened by EPA's own Scientific Advi-
sory Board to re-evaluate the carcinogenic risks of dioxins, noted
that: "Fundamentally, we remain concerned that the reactive pos-
ture of regulatory agencies in this country perpetuate a situation
which condemns us to catching up to situations of environmental,
food and product contamination instead of preventing these and
other ongoing sources of dioxins and related compounds." °6 In
her view, moreover, it was not sufficient "to respond to [the] prob-
lem by developing a strategy that merely transfer[ed] risks from
one vector to another."'0 7 New processes needed to be adopted
that eliminated the problem altogether.108
In principle, EPA seemed to agree with the goal of eliminating
dioxin discharges from the industry. To that effect, the agency is-
sued an interim strategy in September 1988 calling for aggressive
action on dioxin discharges from pulp and paper mills.' 0 9 By re-
quiring states to adopt and enforce stringent water quality stan-
dards for dioxin, EPA sought to induce substantial reductions of
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id. at 5.
108. Id. at 5, 14-15. Janet Heiber of Greenpeace offered testimony on alternatives to
chlorine bleaching then being used in Scandinavia. See id. at 143-144. See also U.S. OFFICE
OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, TECHNoLoGIES FOR REDUCING DioxIN IN THE MANUFACTURE OF
BLEACHED WOOD PULP, OTA-BP-0-54 (1989).
109. See U.S. EPA, Interim Strategy for the Regulation of Pulp and Paper Mill Dioxin Dis-
charges to Waters of the United States, Memorandum from Rebecca W. Hammer, EPA Acting
Administrator for Water, to Water Management Division Directors and NPDES States Di-
rectors, Aug. 9, 1988. Cited in Kimberly M. Thompson &John D. Graham, ProducingPaper
without Dioxin Pollution, in THE GREENING OF INDUsTRY. A RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 229,
229-30 (John D. Graham &Jennifer Kassalow Hartwell eds., 1997).
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dioxin discharges from existing point sources. For those states that
failed to act, EPA threatened to apply its own standards. But EPA
also noted that it was considering a reassessment of dioxin's cancer
risk, effectively opening the door for states to develop their own
risk estimates as a basis for establishing water quality standards. As
a result, the dioxin standards adopted by those states with chlorine
bleaching pulp mills varied by some three orders of magnitude.'
Of those states with the most permissive standards, nine out of
eleven were in the South-the region which has dominated na-
tional pulp and paper production throughout the post World War
II period."1 In late 1989, Georgia became the first state to relax its
dioxin standard, proposing a new standard-7.2 parts per quadril-
lion (ppq)-that was more than 500 times less stringent than EPA's
suggested standard of 0.013 ppq.1 2 Members of the environmental
community expressed outrage and local newspapers suggested that
the state was bowing.to industry pressure."' In March of 1990, the
EPA notified Georgia that it would not approve the new standard
and would impose its own criteria if Georgia did not revise the stan-
dard. i 4 Meanwhile, Maryland and Virginia began revising their
standards, settling on a level of 1.2 ppq, which they arrived at by
using the less stringent cancer potency estimates of the Food and
Drug Administration and an "acceptable risk level" of 1 in 100,000
as opposed to 1 in 1,000,000 excess cancer deaths.'1 5 Recognizing
the uncertainty involved in such risk assessments and ignoring pro-
tests from environmentalists, EPA approved the Maryland and Vir-
110. See Thompson & Graham, supra note 109, at 230-33.
111. See Thompson & Graham, supra note 109, at tbl. 7.2 (identifying the states as
Ala., Ark., Ga., La., Md., Miss., Tenn., Tex., and Va,). On the growth of the pulp and paper
industry in the American South during the post World War II period, see William Boyd,
New South, New Nature: Regional Industrialization and Environmental Change in the
Post-New Deal American South (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley).
112. EPA's guidance criterion of 0.013 ppq came from the Agency's 1984 dioxin cri-
teria document, Ambient Water Quality Criteria for 2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin. In that
document, which summarized the science on dioxin toxicity up to that point, EPA recom-
mended the water quality standard of 0.013 ppq for waters used as a source of drinking
water and edible fish. See NRDC v. U.S. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1399 n.3 (4th Cir. 1993). See also
Board of Natural Resources Adopts Dioxin Standard, PR NEwswlaE, Mar. 29, 1990.
113. See Charles Seabrook, Georgia Board of Natural Resources Tightens Dioxin Standard,
ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Jan. 24, 1991, at D-6 (recounting the controversy over the Georgia
dioxin standard).
114. Id.
115. Background information on the development of the Maryland and Virginia di-
oxin standards can be found in NRDC, 16 F.3d at 1398-99, in which the court rejected
NRDC's challenge to EPA's approval of the Maryland and Virginia dioxin standards.
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ginia standard as within the range of "scientific defensibility," even
though it was some 90 times less stringent than EPA's recom-
mended standard." 6 Georgia and six other southern states (Ala.,
S.C., Miss., Tex., Ark., Tenn.) then adopted the new, "EPA ap-
proved" standard of 1.2 ppq.17 New Hampshire and New York
were the only other states with similarly permissive standards.' At
the other end of the spectrum, Minnesota adopted a standard that
was 100 times stricter than EPA's criteria." 9 Most other states sim-
ply adopted EPA's criteria as their own standards.
20
As the controversy over state standards raged on, EPA also be-
gan releasing preliminary results from both the 104-mill study and
from another study of dioxin concentrations in fish and wildlife.'
They were not encouraging, particularly for a number of paper
mill towns in the South. In the fish study, which was part of a
broader study on bio-accumulation of toxics in fish, EPA research-
ers found that dioxin concentrations in fish downstream from sev-
eral southern pulp and paper mills greatly exceeded the FDA
threshold of 25 parts per trillion (ppt).122 The highest level of con-
tamination in the country, 180 ppt, was found in a particular spe-
cies of fish-the creek chubsucker-downstream from
Weyerhaeuser's mill at Plymouth, North Carolina. 23 The second
highest concentration, 150 ppt, was fourid in carp living down-
stream from International Paper's Bastrop, Louisiana mill.'2 4 As
116. Id. at 1399.
117. See Thompson & Graham, supra note 109, at 230-33.
118. Id. at 231.
119. Id. at 233.
120. Id. at 231.
121. The final summary report was released in July 1990. See OFFICE OF WATER REGU-
LATIONS & STANDARDS, U.S. EPA, SuMMARY REPORT ON U.S. EPA/PAPER INDUSTRY COOPERA-
TIVE DIoXIN STUDY. THE 104 MILL STUDY (1990). The draft "fish study" was released in
1989. See OFFICE OF WATER REGULATIONS & STANDARDS, U.S. EPA, BIOACCUMLATIVE POLLU-
TANTS IN FISH - A NAT'L STUDY, Draft Report (1989). The final report was released in 1992.
See OFFICE OF Sci. AND TEcH., EPA, NAT'L STUDY OF CHEMICAL RESIDUES IN FISH, EPA 823-R-
92-008a (1992). The overall conclusion that emerged from the 104-mill study and the
broader study of chemical residues in fish was that dioxins in pulp and paper mill waste-
water effluent represented the greatest public health concern. Pulp mill sludge, which was
sometimes used as fertilizer on croplands, was identified not only as a secondary source of
health concern, but also as a primary route of ecological concern. EPA did not consider
dioxin in pulp and paper products to be a major risk, but rather "on the borderline of
concern" and referred the issue to the FDA. See PowELL, supra note 8, at 355.
122. See 2 EPA Studies Confirm Threat to Fish of Dioxin From Paper Plants, N.Y. TIMES,
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TABLE 1. EPA LIST OF TwENTY PAPER MILLS ASSOCIATED wrTH
ELEVATED CANCER RISKS FROM FISH CONSUMPTION
IN RECEIVING WATERS, 1990
Company/Location
International Paper Co., Georgetown, SC
Union Camp Corp., Franklin, VA
Buckeye Cellulose, Perry, FL
Weyerhaeuser Co., Plymouth, NC
Westvaco Corp., Covington, VA
Georgia-Pacific Corp., Palatka, FL
International Paper Co., Moss Point, MS
Temple-Eastex Inc., Evandale, TX
Champion International, Canton, NC
Georgia-Pacific Corp., Crossett, AR
International Paper Co., Texarkana, TX
International Paper Co., Jay, ME
Boise Cascade Co., Rumford, ME
St. Joe Paper Co., Port St. Joe, FL
Boise Cascade Co., Derridar, LA
Simpson Paper Co, Anderson, CA and
Louisiana-Pacific Co., Samoa, CA
Simpson Paper Co., Fairhaven, CA
Weyerhaeuser Co., Cosmopolis, WA
Weyerhaeuser Co., Everett, WA














































Source: Press Release R-158, U.S. EPA, EPA Releases Risk Assessments for
Eating Dioxin Contaminated Fish (Sept. 24, 1990).
for the 104-mill study, which measured dioxin concentrations in
pulp mill effluent, the top eleven mills were all located in southern
states.125 International Paper's mill at Georgetown, South Carolina
had the highest concentration of dioxin in its effluent, almost
three times higher than the median for all mills where dioxin was
found.
126
Based on these preliminary results, EPA developed a list of
twenty mills throughout the country (sixteen of which were in the
South) that presented significant cancer risks (more than 1 in
10,000) to those who regularly consumed fish from waters that re-
125. Id.
126. Dioxin concentration in the effluent at the Georgetown mill was 0.64 ppt. The
median concentration for the mills where dioxin was measurable was 0.024 ppt. See id. See
also Peter Applebome, Town Agonizes Over Dioxin Levels, N. Y. TiMas, Sept. 19, 1989, at A20.
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ceived dioxins from the mills. In a 1990 press release summarizing
the results, EPA ranked the mills by cancer risks (see Table 1).127
For those who ate fish from the Sampit River and Winyah Bay
downstream from International Paper's Georgetown mill, the
health risks were hardly trivial. Indeed, according to the EPA, peo-
ple who subsisted on a daily catch of fish from the Sampit faced an
additional cancer risk of one in fifty over a seventy-year lifetime
(EPA's "acceptable" cancer risk from food was one in one mil-
lion). 28 Since fish and shellfish from the Sampit and Winyah Bay
had long been a major source of protein for many of Georgetown's
poorer and predominantly black population, the implications were
quite serious. As Dr. Carl Schulz, a toxicologist from the University
of South Carolina put it, "I'm not a rabid environmentalist ... but I
felt for this particular group of people in Georgetown, it's a very
serious situation. "129
Most residents were confused and angry, particularly in light of
the conflicting messages they were receiving regarding the health
risks they faced. "I don't know which group of scientists is right,"
said Carol Winans, president of the local League of Women Voters,
"but why should I take the risk?"13 James Chandler, an environ-
mental lawyer in the state, put the issue in somewhat broader con-
text: 'We've won some cases lately, and you think you're making
some progress, then something like this comes along and you real-
ize you didn't even know what the problem really was."13'
In response, the industry mounted a systematic and very public
challenge to EPA's findings, charging that the information re-
leased by the agency was misleading and confusing. Dr. Richard
Phillips, staff vice president and director of process technology for
International Paper, argued that
[t]he EPA risk assessment needlessly alarms local communities by
issuing recommendations based upon old data and faulty assump-
127. Press Release R-158, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Releases Risk
Assessments for Eating Dioxin Contaminated Fish (Sept. 24, 1990).
128. U.S. EPA, RisK AssESS~MNTS FOR EATING DIOXIN-CONTAMINATED FISH (1990). See
also Michael Weisskopf, EPA Seeking to Reduce Dioxin in White Paper, Cancer Risk Said toJustif
Mill Restrictions, WASH. Posr, May 1, 1990, at A8; Philip Shabecoff, Government Says Dioxin
Poses No MajorDanger, N.Y. TIMEs, May 1, 1990, at A17. Shabecoff noted that EPA and FDA
officials had concluded that dioxin levels in bleached pulp and paper products were so low
as to present a "negligible" health risk, but that individuals who ate significant quantities of
fish downstream from certain pulp and paper mills did have an elevated cancer risk. Id.
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tions derived from incorrect and obsolete information. The sug-
gestion that eating fish caught downstream from certain paper
mills poses an increased cancer risk is not supported by what we
consider to be the best available science and the most recent fish
test data.
1 32
Phillips then pointed to research done by Dr. John Squire, a re-
search scientist atJohns Hopkins University whose earlier work had
served as the basis for EPA's estimates of the carcinogenic risks as-
sociated with dioxins. Based on more recent research, Squire had
concluded that "dioxin poses no cancer risk to humans at any an-
ticipated levels of exposure.' 1 33 The science wars had begun.
B. Science Wars.
Much of the controversy over dioxin science emerged from the
1990 Banbury Conference, where a new "consensus" was reached
on the biological action of dioxins and dioxin-like compounds at
the molecular level.13 4 Drawing on research conducted since the
mid-1980s, participants at the Banbury conference agreed that di-
oxin-like compounds gain entry into cells by binding to a particular
protein on cells known as the "Ah receptor.'13 5 Some participants
hypothesized that there might be a threshold level of dioxin expo-
sure necessary to initiate the cascade of effects leading to cancer,
concluding from this that low-level exposure to dioxin (such as
that existing at background levels in the environment) posed a
negligible cancer risk.'1 6 Others contested the notion that such bi-
ologically based models could be used to predict the cancer risks
associated with dioxin.' 37 There was no agreement, in other words,
on what the new understanding of the receptor-based mechanism
of action meant in terms of human health risks.'18 Yet, the Banbury
132. International Paper Challenges EPA's Dioxin Risk Assessments, Bus. WiRE, Sept. 25,
1990. Phillips also expressed frustration at the fact that EPA did not acknowledge the pro-
gress it had made at its Georgetown plant in reducing the dioxin levels in the mill's efflu-
ent. See George Lobsenz, Paper Companies Dispute EPA Dioxin Risk Study, UNITED PREsS INT'L,
Sept. 27, 1990.
133. International Paper Challenges, supra note 132.
134. For a discussion of the Banbury Conference, see Leslie Roberts, Dioxin Risks Re-
visited, 251 Sci. 624, 624-26 (1991). See also Eliot Marshall, Toxicology Goes Molecular, 259 Sci.
1394, 1394-96 (noting that dioxin had become a test case for those interested in using
molecular analysis to understand the biological mechanisms of carcinogensis and to pro-
vide a basis for adjusting risk standards).
135. See Roberts, supra note 134. See also CROSBY, supra note 3, at 170-71.
136. See Roberts, supra note 134.
137. Id. See also Leslie Roberts, More Pieces in the Dioxin Puzzle, 254 Sci. 377 (1991).
138. See Roberts, supra note 134. The Banbury Conference stimulated controversy not
simply because of the science. Shortly after the meeting, it was revealed that the Chlorine
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conference did lend credibility to those inside and outside of EPA
who had been calling for a reassessment of the dioxin cancer po-
tency criteria used by the agency.1
3 9
In January 1991, arguments in favor of a reassessment received
additional support from a study of more than five thousand Ameri-
can chemical workers who had been exposed to dioxin on the job.
This study suggested that, at low levels of exposure, dioxin might
be a less potent carcinogen among humans than previously
thought. 4 ° Here, it seemed, was the epidemiological data neces-
sary to bolster the Banbury findings regarding the biological action
of dioxin and the possibility that there might be a safe "threshold"
dose.
Paper industry representatives seized on the results, demanding
that EPA re-evaluate its dioxin risk assessment. 4 ' Meanwhile, scien-
tists within EPA also reiterated their concerns with the existing risk
assessment for dioxin. 42 In response, EPA Administrator William
Reilly initiated a formal reassessment of dioxin risk in April 1991.
Citing the new studies as an impetus for the reassessment, Reilly
noted that "[t] here has been much speculation about the effect of
these'new developments on our revised dioxin risk assessment ....
Some factors may decrease the level of concern. Others may result
in estimates of increased risk." '43 Red Cavaney, president of the
Institute had sponsored the meeting and had hired a public relations firm to circulate a
summary of the results claiming that a "consensus" had been reached on the biological
basis for dioxin risk assessment. A number of participants, including Dr. Ellen Silbergeld of
the University of Maryland, suggested that they had been "manipulated and misused" by
the conference organizers. See Flap Erupts Over Dioxin Meeting 251 Sci. 866 (1991).
139. In 1988, for example, a group of senior EPA scientists concluded that "reliance
on the linearized model [of dose-response] may be less appropriate for TCDD than for
many other chemicals .... and the model may overestimate the upper-bound on the risk by
some unknown amount."John A. Moore et al., The Dioxin TCDD: A Selective Study of Sci. and
Policy Interaction, in KEEPING PACE wrmH Sca. AND ENG'G 229 (M. Uman ed., 1993).
140. The study was published in the New England Journal of Medicine and was di-
rected by Marilyn Fingerhut of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.
It included virtually all chemical workers in the U.S. who were exposed to dioxin between
1942 and 1984, and was one of the largest such studies ever undertaken. For those men
with high levels of exposure for more than one year (and whose exposure occurred at least
twenty years prior to 1987), the death rate from cancer was 46% higher than would have
been expected. For those with lower levels of exposure, however, the report found a cancer
mortality rate that was equivalent to the general population. See M.A. Fingerhut et al., Can-
cer mortality in workers exposed to 2,3, 7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 212,
212-18 (1991). For press reaction, see Karen Klinger, Dioxin Does Not Appear Potent Cancer
Agen4 UnanED PRFss Iter'L, Jan. 24, 1991. See also Roberts, supra note 134, at 625.
141. U.S. to Review Dioxin Risk Given New Studies, N.Y. TimES, Apr. 16, 1991, at C5.
142. See Roberts, supra note 134.
143. U.S. to Review Dioxin Risk Given New Studies, supra note 141.
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API, applauded EPA's decision, charging that the existing assess-
ment of dioxin risk was "too stringent, in light of all the evolving
science that has come out."1" Adding fuel to the fire, Dr. Vernon
Houk, the assistant Surgeon General and Director of the Center
for Environmental Health and Injury Control at the Centers for
Disease Control in Atlanta, concluded that "[i]f it's a carcinogen,
it's a very weak carcinogen and Federal policy needs to reflect
that." 45 Houk, the government scientist who made the original de-
cision to evacuate Times Beach, Missouri in the early 1980s, also
suggested that, in hindsight, that decision was an error: "Given
what we know now about this chemical's toxicity and its effects on
human health, it looks as though the evacuation was
unnecessary.'
'1 4 6
Members of the environmental community responded by argu-
ing that the new studies supported the claim that dioxin was as
dangerous as ever and suggested that the reassessment was politi-
cally motivated. Environmental Defense Fund scientist Dr. Ellen
Silbergeld, who was also a professor of pathology at the University
of Maryland School of Medicine in Baltimore, stated that
"[n]othing that has been learned about dioxin since 1985 when
EPA first published its risk assessment finding on dioxin in the en-
vironment supports a revision of science-based policy or action."'
47
Speaking somewhat more directly to the issue of politics, Dr. Mary
O'Brien, director of an Oregon non-profit research group focusing
on dioxin, claimed: "What's being protected here is not people or
the environment but industries favored by the Government. The
Government begins with the assumption that these industrial activi-
ties have to go on and they adjust the data to make the existing
pollution practices acceptable."' 48
EPA Administrator Reilly, however, brushed off the criticisms
and urged that all parties wait for the reassessment. Still, he more
or less admitted to opening up a can of worms:
I don't want to prejudge the issue, but we are seeing new infor-
mation on dioxin that suggests a lower risk assessment for dioxin
should be applied. I know the stakes and [I know] that I'm unrav-
eling something here. There is not much precedence in the Fed-
144. Id.
145. See Keith Schneider, U.S. Backing Away from Saying Dioxin is a Deadly Peril, N.Y.






eral establishment for pulling back from a judgment of toxicity.
But we need to be prepared to adjust, to raise or lower standards,
as new science becomes available.' 49
Scheduled to take only a year, it took more than three to produce a
draft.'5 ° Meanwhile, the dioxin debate raged on.
C. Toxic Torts
Well before EPA released the results of its reassessment, the di-
oxin controversy spilled over into the courtroom. During the early
1990s, plaintiffs' lawyers in several southern states rushed to file
lawsuits against various pulp and paper firms for polluting water-
ways with dioxin which, the attorneys argued, endangered the
health and diminished the property values of downstream re-
sidents.'' The action began in southern Mississippi with a 1991
case involving a mill at New August, Mississippi run by a Georgia
Pacific subsidiary, Leaf River Forest Products, which Georgia Pa-
cific had acquired as part of its 1990 takeover of Great Northern
Nekoosa Corp (Leaf River's parent company).'52 Previously, EPA
had listed the Leaf River mill as having the fifth highest dioxin
level in its effluent in the country and had included it as one of the
top twenty mills posing "significant" cancer risks to people who reg-
ularly ate fish downstream from the mill.' 3 As a result, the state of
Mississippi had banned commercial fishing and catfish consump-
tion along the river for some forty miles below the mill.'- 4 Wesley
M. Simmons, a retired commercial fisherman who owned a recrea-
tional camp on the Leaf River thirty-seven miles below the mill,
decided to sue Georgia Pacific for failing to warn him of the dioxin
pollution in the river, diminishing the value of his property, and
149. Id.
150. See infra Part III.D.
151. For a discussion of some of the early lawsuits, particularly in Mississippi, see
Nicholas Varchavar, Muddy Waters, Am. LAWYER, July-Aug. 1993, at 52. See also Paul Kemezis,
Lawsuits Could Mount for Papermakers, CHEM. WEEK, Feb. 13, 1991, at 24.
152. Procedural history of the initial lawsuit by Wesley Simmons is discussed in Leaf
River Forest Products, Inc. v. Simmons, 697 So. 2d 1083 (Miss. 1996).
153. See Varchavar, supra note 151, at 57.
154. Upon discovering dioxin in the effluent and sludge produced by the Leaf River
mill, the Mississippi Department of Wildlife and Fisheries dosed the Leaf, Pascagoula, and
Escatawpa Rivers (all of which received waste water from the Leaf River Mill) to commer-
cial fishing from October 1991 toJanuary 1991, and issued consumption advisories for fish
caught from the Leaf and Pascagoula Rivers. The state subsequently lifted the consump-
tion advisory for the Pascagoula River in December 1990, but not for the Leaf River. Back-
ground information can be found in Leaf River Forest Products, Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So. 2d
648, 650-51 (Miss. 1995).
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causing him emotional distress because of the fear of future disease
that came from years of eating contaminated fish. 5'
Simmons' lawyer, John Deakle of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, a
man so tenacious "he'd fight a circle saw" according to one ac-
quaintance, effectively turned the case into a moral crusade against
Georgia Pacific.' 56 Playing off local populist sentiments, Deakle
used company and industry documents, including the API docu-
ments recovered by Greenpeace, to paint a picture of a greedy cor-
poration willing to trade pollution for profits. "Take the profit out
of what they have done to the river," Deakle pleaded with the jury,
"your vote can make a difference."' 7 He then asked the jury to
award his plaintiff compensatory damages for nuisance and tres-
pass and some $70 million in punitive damages.158 In reaching its
verdict, the jury rejected Deakle's emotional distress argument, but
did award Simmons more than $40,000 in compensatory damages
for nuisance, trespass, and loss of property value and some $1 mil-
lion in punitive damages.' 59 Although Georgia Pacific immediately
appealed, the verdict sent shock waves through the industry as ma-
jor firms began to fear a potential avalanche of asbestos-style law-
suits seeking massive damages. 6 °  The highly uncertain,
emotionally charged world of toxic torts was not a place where
these firms wanted to be.
By February 1991, such fears seemed to be materializing. More
than 7,000 individual cases had been filed in four Mississippi coun-
ties alone.' 6 ' Deakle himself, who had started with only a handful
of clients, was suddenly representing some 6,000 plaintiffs, includ-
ing more than a thousand who had filed claims against a nearby
International Paper mill.'62 Plaintiffs from other states soon began
to file similar lawsuits. The floodgates had opened.
Up in Tennessee, J.A. and Joan Shults, who lived on the Pigeon
River, filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of several thousand local
property owners against Champion International. 6  They asked
155. Simmons' claims are discussed in Simmons, 697 So. 2d at 1083-86. See also
Varchavar, supra note 151, at 57-59.
156. See Varchavar, supra note 151, at 55.
157, Id. at 57.
158. Id. at 58.
159. Figures are reported in Simmons, 697 So. 2d at 1083.
160. See Kemezis, supra note 151, at 24.
161. Id.
162. Varchavar, supra note 151, at 59.
163. J.A. Shults &Joan Shults v. Champion Int'l Corp., 821 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Tenn.
1992). For a discussion of the case, see BARTLE-r, supra note 89, at 265.
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for $5 billion, alleging that Champion's pollution had diminished
the value of their property, disrupted their lives, and threatened
them with cancer. Coming on the heels of the 1988 Pigeon River
hearings, this was a power play that had the potential to propel
dioxin litigation into the big leagues.'64 The plaintiffs' attorneys
pulled out all the stops-charging, for example, that Champion's
conduct was "so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and must be re-
garded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society."
1 65
It would take another twenty-one months before the case would go
to trial.
1 66
Meanwhile, John Deakle took his second Leaf River case against
Georgia Pacific to trial.167 Initially, he was joined by another group
of plaintiffs, though Georgia Pacific quickly and quietly settled with
this group for an undisclosed sum. 168 On his own, Deakle pursued
the same basic strategy he used in the Simmons case. But this time
he wanted to make the emotional distress argument stick. To that
effect, one of his plaintiffs, Thomas Ferguson, offered some rather
emotional testimony. Georgia Pacific, Ferguson claimed,
took my rights away from me. I can't swim where I want to swim
no more. I can't fish. I can't do lots of things. And got me wor-
ried about cancer. They've got a sign out there from the Missis-
sippi Wildlife that says don't eat fish out of these waters, it's
contaminated with dioxin and causes cancer. But I've ate hun-
dreds of pounds of fish unbeknowing that it had dioxin .... It
gets you worried and shakes you up and makes you break
down.
169
Despite'the fact that Ferguson admitted under cross-examination
that he was not sick and had never been tested for dioxin, the jury
awarded him and his wife $90,000 each for emotional distress,
$10,000 for nuisance and $3 million in punitive damages.7 0 This
was the second favorable plaintiffs' judgment in a dioxin case
against a pulp and paper mill in little more than a year. Again,
Georgia Pacific appealed.' 7 ' The message seemed clear, however.
164. See BARTLEr, supra note 89, at 265.
165. Id. at 266.
166. Id.
167. Lead plaintiffs were Thomas and Bonnie Jane Ferguson. For background, see
Leaf River Forest Products, Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So. 2d 648, 650-51 (Miss. 1995).
168. Varchavar, supra note 151, at 69.
169. Id. at 61.
170. Id. at 63.
171. Id. at 64.
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There was money, perhaps a great deal, in these toxic tort cases.
The following March, less than three months after Deakle won
his second trial, a group of lawyers filed a $100 billion class-action
lawsuit in Texas seeking damages from thirty-three pulp and paper
firms and the API for "dioxin poisoning.117 2 This was such an ex-
cessive claim that the suit was withdrawn the following month. Yet
it suggested the extremes to which plaintiffs' attorneys might push
the issue."' From the perspective of industry executives, the situa-
tion was threatening to spin out of control.
The swelling tide of litigation gave added urgency to the Pigeon
River lawsuit slowly working its way to trial in east Tennessee. In
contrast to Deakle's cases, the Pigeon River case would be tried in
federal district court, giving it greater visibility and added weight.
The financial stakes were also considerably higher, with some 2,600
plaintiffs seeking $5 billion in damages. 74 The paper industry did
not want to lose this one, and they worked hard during pretrial
maneuvers to limit the scope of the trial.175
Their efforts paid off. By the time the case went to trial in Sep-
tember 1992, the damage claims had been reduced to $2.9 million
in compensatory damages and $365 million in punitive damages.176
More important, Champion's attorneys also succeeded in getting
the judge to throw out all emotional distress claims and, by invok-
ing the statute of limitations, to restrict any damages to the period
after January 1988 (three years before the case was filed).177 Fi-
nally, they restricted the issues before the court to charges of tres-
pass (by pollution rather than people) and nuisance.178
Referring to the company as "an arrogant power run amok,"
Don Barrett, the lead plaintiffs' attorney, opened the trial by argu-
ing that "[t]his whole case can be summed up in a few words-
pollution for profit."'1 79 Champion's attorneys responded by argu-
ing that pollution per sewas not the issue.18° Rather, they steadfastly
maintained that the question was whether or not the plaintiffs had
172. See $100 Billion Suit Accuses Paper Firms of Dioxin Poisonings, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6,
1992, at D4.
173. Id. See also Class-Action Lawsuit Dropped, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 3, 1992, at C13.
174. BARTLEtrr, supra note 89, at 265-66.
175. Id. at 266-68.
176. Id. at 268.
177. Id.
178. Id




suffered any diminution of property values because of Champion's
actions.' 8' Champion attorneys also emphasized all of the scientific
uncertainties associated with dioxin and the disagreements among
scientists about its toxicity and cancer potency.'82 Finally, Cham-
pion vice president Richard DiFlorio testified that the mill had
complied with all rules and regulations, that, in his view at least,
"the problem [was] aesthetic,'18 3 and that the mill was in the midst
of switching to a bleaching process that used less chlorine and
therefore reduced the dioxin load in the mill's effluent.
84
In closing arguments, Champion attorney Louis Woolf claimed
that the charges against Champion consisted of "[r]umors, gossip,
and hearsay" and implied that the plaintiffs were simply after
money they did not really deserve. 85 Plaintiffs' attorneys re-
sponded with an equally predictable argument-invoking the story
of David and Goliath and asking the jury to "render a verdict that
will cause Champion and all other Champions of this country to
shudder in their boardrooms."186 After three and a half days of de-
liberation, the jury could not reach a verdict, and the judge de-
clared a mistrial. 187 For the time being, Champion had dodged a
bullet. Rather than face another trial, the company decided to set-
tie. In March 1993, Champion agreed to pay $6.5 million to 'the
plaintiffs.' 8  In exchange, the court barred all further trespass, nui-
sance, and personal injury claims against Champion pertaining to
any actions of the company prior to the date of the settlement. 189
This case was closed.
In the months and years that followed, there were other dioxin
lawsuits and settlements. InJune 1993, Kimberly-Clark Corporation
agreed to pay $6.5 million to settle a class-action lawsuit involving
dioxin contamination from its pulp and paper mill in Coosa Pines,
Alabama. 9 ' Three years later, Champion was back in the news,
paying out $5 million to settle with a class of Alabama plaintiffs for
property damage resulting from dioxin-contaminated effluent
181. Id.
182. Id. at 272-73.
183. Id. at 272.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 273
186. Id.
187. Id
188. Id. at 274.
189. Id. at 274-75.
190. See $6.5 Million Settlement Announced in Dioxin Case, ME~.uys LmG. REPORTS:
Toxic TORTS 2, No. 7, July 1, 1993.
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from one of its mills.191 As in Tennessee, under the terms of the
Alabama settlement, Champion admitted no wrongdoing or liabil-
ity and was released from all further liability for property damages
stemming from the mill's discharge prior to the date of the settle-
ment.192 These settlements, while not insubstantial, were a far cry
from the massive damages that plaintiffs had sought in the early
nineties.
Meanwhile, back in Mississippi, things were not going so well
for John Deakle. In 1995, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed
the $3.2 million judgment in the Ferguson case, refusing to recog-
nize the emotional distress claims as compensable torts under Mis-
sissippi law and rejecting the nuisance claims for lack of pr'oof.
9 3
Then, inJune 1996, a Mississippi circuit courtjudge dismissed four
dioxin suits brought by Deakle and others against International Pa-
per on behalf of more than 1,800 plaintiffs.'9 4 The following
month the same judge dismissed 206 suits brought by Deakle and
others against Georgia Pacific's Leaf River mill on behalf of some
5,400 plaintiffs.' 95 In December 1996, the Mississippi Supreme
Court reversed the $1.047 million judgment that Deakle had won
for his original plaintiff, Wesley Simmons, in 1990.196 Based on the
court's holdings in these cases, the defendant pulp and paper com-
panies won summary judgment in several other dioxin cases.'
9 7
In the end, the great toxic tort bonanza that John Deakle and
191. See $5 Million Settlement Approved in Dioxin Property Damage Action, MEALiE's LrrIG.
REPORTS: EMERGING Toxic TORTS 5, No. 4, May 31, 1996.
192. Id.
193. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So. 2d 648 (Miss. 1995). In re-
jecting claims for both negligently and intentionally inflicted emotional distress, the court
stated emphatically that it had "never allowed or affirmed a claim of emotional distress
based on a fear of contracting a disease or illness in the future, however reasonable." 1l at
658. Pointing to the failure of the plaintiffs to offer any proof that they had actually been
exposed to dioxin from the Leaf River mill, the court refused to create such a tort out of
the facts of the Ferguson case. Id. at 657-60. See also Emotional Distress Claims Rejected in
Mississippi Exposure Action, MEALE's LrrIG. REPORTS: Toxic TORTS 4, No. 15, Nov. 3, 1995.
194. See Mississippi Judge Dismisses Last of Dioxin Suits Against International Paper Co.,
Toxic CHEMS. LITIG. REP., Aug. 6, 1996 at 23,489.
195. Id.
196. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v. Simmons, 697 So. 2d 1083 (Miss. 1996). Here
the court relied on its holding in the Ferguson case to dismiss plaintiffs emotional distress
and nuisance claims. In rejecting Simmons' trespass claims, the court found that Simmons
had failed to meet the burden of proving an actual physical invasion of his property by
dioxin discharged from a mill located forty miles upstream. Id. at 1085-86.
197. See, e.g., Prescott v. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc., 740 So. 2d 301 (Miss. 1999)
(affirming summary judgment for the defendants); Herrington v. Leaf River Forest Prods.,
Inc., 733 So. 2d 774 (Miss. 1999) (same); Angaldo v. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc., 716 So.
2d 543 (Miss. 1998) (same).
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others had hoped for turned out to be somewhat of a bust. Scien-
tific uncertainty over the nature of the harm associated with dioxin
exposure and the concomitant difficulties in proving causation in
the absence of any illness severely limited the viability of personal
injury claims under theories of negligence and strict liability. Given
the absence of a clearly established causal link between dioxin ex-
posure and serious illness, plaintiffs pursued their personal injury
claims in the tenuous world of emotional distress for fear of future
illness. At the same time, while the trespass and nuisance claims for
damages from dioxin contamination of property proved more via-
ble, these legal doctrines had inherent limits as vehicles for the
kind of massive self-sustaining tort litigation that has characterized
the asbestos area. As a result of these various legal and factual limi-
tations, dioxin pollution from pulp and paper mills failed to ripen
into the kind of toxic harm that can find significant purchase in
the tort system. Not surprisingly, paper company executives who
once feared a litigation explosion that might threaten the solvency
of their firms moved on to other concerns.
Still, the potential of substantial asbestos-like liability in the wake
of the initial victories of the early 1990s had two important effects
on pulp and paper firms. First, it reinforced incentives to imple-
ment new procedures that used less chlorine in the bleaching pro-
cess in order to demonstrate "progress" in dealing with the
problem. If corporations could show that they were not only meet-
ing state and/or federal standards for dioxin, but also modernizing
their mills to reduce their dioxin loads, they might have a stronger
case. 19 8 For the most part, this involved substituting chlorine diox-
ide for elemental chlorine in the beaching process. 99 Beginning in
the late1980s and accelerating during the early1990s, pulp and pa-
per firms began voluntarily adopting chlorine dioxide as their prin-
198. For example, in Ferguson, Georgia-Pacific personnel testified that the company
had made a concerted effort to reduce dioxin pollution from the Leaf River mill during
the early 1990s largely through substitution of chlorine dioxide for chlorine as the princi-
pal bleaching agent used at the mill. See 662 So. 2d at 654 (recounting the testimony of
Warren Richardson and Acker Smith). For a discussion of the difficulties involved in using
the regulatory compliance defense in the products liability area, see Robert L. Rabin, Reas-
sessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEo. LJ. 2049 (2000).
199. For a discussion of bleaching technologies and the benefits of substituting chlo-
rine dioxide for elemental chlorine as a bleaching agent, see U.S. EPA, PROFILE OF THE
PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY 30-35 (1995); U.S. EPA, SUMMARY OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE
CONTROL AND REDUCTION OF CHLORINATED ORGANICS FROM THE BLEACHED CHEMICAL PULP-
ING SUBCATEGORIES OF THE PULP AND PAPER INLUSTRY (1990).
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cipal bleaching agent.200 As a result, dioxin levels in their effluent
began to decline. Between 1988 and 1993, for example, the dis-
charge of 2,3,7,8, TCDD (dioxin) in effluent from bleached pulp
and paper mills declined from 201 grams per year to 71 grams per
year.2 1 By 1995, bleaching mills had further reduced the dioxin
discharges in their effluent to 16 grams per year.212 Firms involved
in dioxin litigation were quick to use this as evidence of how
promptly they had responded to the problem.20 3
The potential liability associated with dioxin litigation also im-
pacted the politics surrounding dioxin science. At the same time
that they were making process improvements to reduce their chlo-
rine use, pulp and paper firms involved in dioxin litigation also
sought to emphasize the scientific uncertainty surrounding di-
oxin.20 4 During the major court battles, industry advocates con-
stantly pointed to the disagreements among reputable scientists
about dioxin's cancer potency.205 Likewise, industry experts also
testified to the lack of any significant evidence of increased cancer
risk in people exposed to dioxin downstream from pulp and paper
mills. 2°6 By emphasizing such uncertainty, the industry hoped to
cast doubt on some of the arguments being made by the opposi-
tion, particularly in the area of causation. Scientific uncertainty, in
200. By 1994, chlorine dioxide usage (in tons) exceeded elemental chlorine usage in
the bleaching process. U.S. EPA, PROFILE OF THE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY, supra note 199,
at 33.
201. See U.S. EPA, SOURCES OF DIOxIN-LIKE COMPOUNDS IN THE UNITED STATES, tbl. 8-3
(2000).
202. Id. According to the American Forest & Paper Association, the new industry
trade association created through the merger of the American Paper Institute and the
American Pulp and Paper Association, the industry spent some $1 billion on dioxin reduc-
tion measures between 1988 and 1992. See Cindy Skrzycki, Pulp Friction: The EPA's Tussle
Over Paper Pollutant Rules, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1997, at GI.
203. See, e.g., the discussion of the testimony by Georgia Pacific personnel in Fergu-
son. 662 So. 2d at 654 (Miss. 1995).
204. See, e.g., BARTLE'r, supra note 89, at 271-72 (discussing efforts by defendants to
emphasize the uncertainties endemic to dioxin science).
205. Id.
206. In Ferguson, former EPA Administrator Lee M. Thomas testified for the defense
that there were no data showing dioxin to be a human carcinogen. Dr. John Doull, profes-
sor of toxicology and pharmacy at the University of Kansas, also testified that there was no
evidence suggesting the people living downstream from bleaching pulp and paper mills
had any reason to fear contracting cancer from dioxin exposure. See 662 So. 2d at 656.
Finally, Dr. Renate Kimbrough, an expert in public health and epidemiology who had
worked for the CDC, the FDA, and the EPA, testified to the lack of any convincing evi-
dence showing excess cancer rates in people exposed to dioxin at concentrations several
times higher than that alleged to be present in the Leaf and Pascagoula Rivers. See id.
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short, could be exploited as effectively in the courtroom as in the
regulatory arena.
D. Dioxin Science and the Regulatory Process
By the mid-1990s, with dioxin litigation waning, attention
shifted back to the regulatory arena. In September 1993, the Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council and fifty-five other environmental
groups filed a petition under the Clean Water Act demanding that
EPA ban all dioxin discharges by the pulp and paper industry by
prohibiting the use chlorine in the bleaching process.2 °7 Three
months later, EPA proposed effluent rules for dioxin discharges
from pulp and paper mills as part of a larger "cluster rule" contain-
ing air and water standards for the industry-the Agency's first at-
tempt at "multi-media" regulation.20° The proposed dioxin rules
called for total chlorine free (TCF) bleaching only at sulfite
mills, 2 9 a small subset of the industry. For the other mills, the pro-
posed rules called for substitution of chlorine dioxide for chlorine
combined with oxygen delignification-a process that further re-
duced chlorine use in the bleaching process. 210 According to EPA
estimates, compliance with the proposed rules (including those for
air emissions) would cost the industry $3.84 billion, result in clo-
sure of eleven to thirteen mills, and lead to a loss of between 2,880
207. PoWELL, supra note 11, at 343.
208. The proposed rules were announced in December 1993, formally satisfying one
of EPA's major obligations under the 1988 consent decree that resolved the Agency's litiga-
tion with the Environmental Defense Fund and the National Wildlife Federation over the
regulation of dioxin from pulp and paper mills. Pursuant to its authority under the Clean
Water Act and the Clean Air Act, EPA proposed the new regulations with the express pur-
pose of"reduc[ing] the discharge of water pollutants and emissions of hazardous air pollu-
tants from the pulp, paper, and paperboard industry, notjust with end-of-pipe and add-on
controls, but also by eliminating or reducing the formation of these pollutants." See Efflu-
ent Limitations Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg. 66,078, 66,078 (Dec. 17, 1993) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 63, 430).
209. Sulfite mills, which accounted for approximately four percent of U.S. pulping
capacity in the mid-1990s, rely on an acid solution of sulfurous acid and bisulfate ions in
the pulping process. In contrast, Kraft or sulfate mills, which use a sodium-based alkaline
pulping solution, accounted for roughly 80% of US pulping capacity during this time.
Sulfite pulps generally have less color than kraft pulps and thus can be more easily
bleached. See U.S. EPA, PROFILE OF THE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY, supra note 199, at 22-23.
See Effluent Limitations Guidelines, supra note 208, tbl. IV.A-2 (summarizing proposed reg-
ulations regarding bleaching technology for the various segments of the pulp and paper
industry).
210. See Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg. 66,085, tbl. IVA-2.
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and 10,700 jobs.211 Dioxins and related compounds generated by
the industry would subsequently be reduced by more than three
hundred grams per year in wastewater effluent, a reduction of
ninety percent from existing levels.21 2
The industry quickly responded with its own estimates of com-
pliance costs that were much higher than those of EPA. According
to the American Forest & Paper Association, the successor to the
API, compliance with the new rules would shut down thirty mills,
cost $10 billion in capital expenditures, and eliminate 27,500 jobs,
including 19,000 at the mill level.213 Luke Popovich, a spokesman
for the American Forest & Paper Association, claimed that the new
cluster rule was "likely to be the costliest regulatory program ever
imposed on a single industry by the EPA.
'2 14 Not surprisingly, dur-
ing the comment period on the proposed rules, pulp and paper
industry advocates flooded the EPA with data supporting their con-
tention that any move to eliminate chlorine altogether from the
bleaching process could not be justified on an economic basis.
2 5
Environmental groups, on the other hand, criticized the proposed
rules as too lenient and urged that the government require total
chlorine-free bleaching.216 EPA went back to the drawing board,
and the debate raged on for the better part of four years.
1. EPA's dioxin risk assessment.
Meanwhile, in 1994, EPA released the first external draft of its
highly anticipated dioxin risk reassessment.21 7 Based on three years
of work by more than a hundred scientists from inside and outside
of EPA, several public meetings, and an extensive peer-review pro-
cess, the 2,400-page report was widely considered to be the most
thorough assessment of dioxin risks to date (and one of the most
thorough assessments ever made of any toxic compound) .21' The
211. See Kelly H. Ferguson & Kirk J. Finchem, The 'Cluster Rule' Continues: Industry
Asks, What Now? PULP & PAPER, Nov. 1997, at 39-41.
212. See Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg. 66,130-31.
213. See Ferguson & Finchem, supra note 211, at 3941; Bill Nichols, EPA's Proposed
Cluster Rules Shape U.S. Paper Industhy's Near Future, PULP & PAPER, Sept. 1994, at 75-85.
214. See Paper Indust7y Braces for Costly Anti-Pollution Rules, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct.
29, 1993.
215. Ferguson & Finchem, supra note 211, at 40.
216. Id.
217. EPA HEALTH ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT FOR 2,3,7,8-TCDD, supra note 7.
218. For background information on the reassessment process, see Reassessment of
2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (2,3,7,8-TCDD, dioxin), 59 Fed. Reg. 46,980 (Sept. 13,
1994). See alsoJeffJohnson, Dioxin Risk: Are We Sure Yet?, 29 ENVrL. Sc. & TECH. 24 (1995)
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report's major findings were not encouraging, particularly for
those who had previously advocated the reassessment on the pre-
sumption that dioxin's risks had been overstated. Indeed, not only
did the draft report reaffirm dioxin's status as a "probable" human
carcinogen, but it also pointed to a variety of other non-cancer
health effects that were far greater than previously expected. 9
These included various reproductive and developmental effects,
disruption of the endocrine system, immunotoxicity, and several
other potential metabolic and hormonal disturbances.220 Some of
these effects were thought to happen at or close to background
exposure levels.22 '
In a departure from previous assessments, EPA also included
other "dioxin-like" compounds in the reassessment. The argument
for doing so stemmed from the fact that these chemically related
compounds (such as furans and polychlorinated bi-phenyls or
PCBs) operated in a similar manner to dioxin at the molecular
'level (primarily by binding to the Ah receptor). Scientists from
EPA and elsewhere thus argued that all of these compounds
should be evaluated together for their cumulative effects. Doing
this required that the potency of each compound be measured or
estimated and given a toxic equivalency factor or TEF ranking rela-
tive to 2,3,7,8-TCDD, which would have a TEF of one.222 On this
basis, the agency then developed an overall index of public health
risks associated with aggregate exposure to these compounds. Al-
though somewhat controversial, this represented an important step
towards a more complete risk assessment and one that better re-
flected "real-world" conditions.
The report noted that hazardous and municipal waste incinera-
tors accounted for the majority of releases to the environment.
223
(noting that the 1994 reassessment represented the most comprehensive examination of
dioxin and dioxin-like compounds undertaken by the EPA up to that point).
219. On the issue of dioxin's carcinogenicity, the draft report concluded that "[in
summary, publication of additional studies of human populations exposed to dioxin and
related compounds since the last EPA assessment has strengthened the inference, based
on all the evidence from mechanistic, animal, and epidemiologic studies, that these com-
pounds are appropriately characterized as probable human carcinogens." See EPA HaLTH
AssEmrrNT Docuammrr FOR 2,3,7,8-TCDD, supra note 7, at 9-42.
220. Id. at 9-43 to 9-51.
221. Ia
222. Potency was determined largely by the number and position of chlorine or bro-
mine atoms on the dioxin-like molecule, which correlated with the relative ability of the
compound to bind to the Ah receptor, the critical step in mediating the "toxic end points"
of this class of compounds. Id. at 9-68.
223. Id. at 9-10 to 9-11.
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Pulp and paper bleaching was listed as a source, though not of the
same magnitude as incinerators.224 Given the importance of incin-
eration as a source, atmospheric- deposition was considered to be
the major vector of environmental transport, while food intake
(particularly fish, beef, pork, and chicken) appeared to be the
most important pathway for human exposure.225 Background levels
in the general population were estimated to be between forty and
sixty ppt when all dioxins, furans, and PCBs were included.226
High-end estimates of the body burdens for the top ten percent of
the general population were possibly three times higher than the
average.227 Overall, EPA estimated that the average "body burden"
of dioxins and dioxin-like compounds in the general population
resulted in an additional cancer risk of one in ten thousand to one
in one thousand per year.228 In other words, based on these esti-
mates current "background" levels of exposure were already posing
additional cancer risks that were substantially higher than the one
in one million threshold that EPA considered "acceptable."229
Moreover, a variety of non-cancer effects were also thought to oc-
cur at background levels of exposure.23 °
Although the draft report did not point to any significant differ-
ences in exposure rates due to ethnicity, socio-economic status or
geographic location, it did identify several potential "highly ex-
posed populations." 23 1 Breast-feeding infants constituted one such
group.232 Due to the levels of dioxins and dioxin-like compounds
in mother's milk, nursing infants received between four and twelve
percent of their total lifetime intake during the first year of life.233
This finding was particularly disturbing in light of the fact that de-
veloping infants are considered to be far more sensitive to dioxins
and dioxin-like chemicals than older people. 234 Given the cumula-
224. Id. at 9-9.
225. Id. at 9-12.
226. This was the equivalent of 40-60 picograms of dioxin Toxic Equivalence per
gram of lipid. Id. at 9-76.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 9-85.
229. id
230. Id. at 9-86. As noted previously, major non-cancer effects included various repro-
ductive and developmental effects, disruption of the endocrine system, immunotoxicity,
and several other potential metabolic and hormonal disturbances. Id. at 9-43 to 9-51.
231. Id. at 9-18.
232. Id. at 9-18 to 9-20.
233. Id. at 9-19.
234. Id. at 9-19 to 9-20. See also COLBURN ET. AL., supra note 14, at 118-20 (citing
animal studies documenting heightened sensitivity to dioxin exposure at prenatal and
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five effects of these substances, early exposure might also influence
later susceptibility to dioxin toxicity.2 35 Other highly exposed sub-
populations identified by the report included workers exposed in
occupationM settings and industrial accidents, people who lived
near discrete local sources, and subsistence fishermen who con-
sumed large amounts of fish from areas where dioxin concentra-
tions in the fish were high.236 Although the data were spotty,
several studies of subsistence fishermen around the world reported
levels of dioxins and dioxin-like compounds in their blood that
were three to twenty times higher than the average background
levels for the general population.23 7
On the whole, then, the reassessment confirmed dioxin's status
as one of the most potent toxicants ever studied and suggested that
current levels of exposure created a human health hazard. This was
obviously not what industry representatives had hoped for when
they asked for the reassessment in 1991. Predictably, industry advo-
cates, along with non-EPA scientists, criticized the findings. One
group of scientists assembled by the American Forest & Paper Asso-
ciation argued that EPA did not have "sufficient scientific evi-
dence" to reach its "alarming conclusion" regarding the existence
of adverse health effects at or near current background body bur-
den levels.238 Along somewhat similar lines, a report issued by the
French Academy of Sciences seemed to directly contradict the EPA
report, concluding that "[c] ontrary to popular opinion, there is no
evidence to suggest that dioxins and their related compounds con-
stitute a major risk to public health."23 9 Citing the French work as
well as a draft review of EPA's reassessment conducted by the
agency's own Scientific Advisory Board, one toxicologist suggested
in a Wall Street Journal op-ed piece that EPA's reassessment had
been compromised by politics from the start.240 "Like asking a fox
to design the building specifications for the chicken coop," she
postnatal stages of development). This suggests that the timing of the dose might turn out
to be as important as the dose itself in determining the risks of adverse health effects over
an average lifetime.
235. EPA HEALTH ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT FOR 2,3,7,8-TCDD, supra note 7, at 9-67.
236. Id. at 9-18 to 9-22.
237. Id. at 9-20 to 9-22.
238. Envtl. Dioxin Risk Characterization Expert Panel, EPA Assessment NotJustified, 29
ENvrL. Sci. & TECH. 31 (1995).
239. Cited in Allison Lucas et al., Health Studies Raise More Questions in Chlorine Debate,
CHEM. WEEK, Dec. 21-28, 1994, at 26.
240. Kathryn E. Kelly, Cleaning Up EPA's Dioxin Mess, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1995, at
2002]
390 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
noted, "asking EPA to conduct scientific research and then regu-
late objectively on the basis of those results creates a hopeless con-
flict of interest."24 She then charged that "[m] uch of EPA's flawed
position on dioxins has been based on internal research, much of
which has not met international standards for scientific review.
242
In response, EPA Assistant Administrator Dr. Robert Hugget noted
that much of the science incorporated in the report was not per-
formed by EPA but instead came from peer-reviewed literature
from around the world and that EPA's own science had in fact
been subjected to rigorous external peer-review, involving hun-
dreds of scientists from outside the agency.
243
Members of the environmental community generally praised
the reassessment. Some also clearly relished the fact that the results
had not turned out as the original advocates of the reassessment
had hoped. Peter deFur, a toxicologist with the Environmental De-
fense Fund, suggested that "[i] ndustry [was] about to be bitten by
the snake it loosed." '244 Others pointed to research contained
within the report that reinforced earlier arguments claiming that
there was no "safe" level of exposure to dioxin and that even if
there were, background exposure levels were already high enough
to generate "unacceptable" risks by EPA's own standards.245 Conse-
quently, they argued, "EPA must rigorously eliminate sources as
well as exposures, recognizing that each exposure threatens
human health and the environment.
'24 6
The review conducted by EPA's own Scientific Advisory Board
(SAB), recommended only minor changes to sections of the report
devoted to reviewing the scientific literature on dioxin.2 47 The SAB
specifically commended EPA for including a broader class of di-
oxin-like compounds and for focusing on non-cancer effects in ad-
dition to carcinogenic effects.24 8 It also praised the way in which
EPA had conducted the process.249
However, the SAB review did note three major weaknesses asso-
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. RobertJ. Huggett, EPA's Dioxin Review is Science, Not Policy, WALL ST. J., July 19,
1995, at All (Letters to the Editor).
244. See Sharon Begley & Mary Hager, Don't Drink the Dioxin, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19,
1994.
245. Richard Clapp et al., EPA on the Right Track, 29 ENVrL. Sci. & TECH. 29 (1995).
246. Id.
247. U.S. EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, DIOXIN REASSESSMENT REVIEW (1995).




ciated with the way in which EPA had characterized dioxin risks.
First, most, though not all, members of the SAB review committee
concluded that the report exhibited "a tendency to overstate the
possibility for danger" associated with dioxin exposure.250 Second,
SAB concluded that EPA had not been as thorough as it could have
been in identifying and analyzing some of the "important uncer-
tainties associated with the Agency's conclusions."25' Finally, SAB
suggested that the characterization of non-cancer risks had not
been performed in a way that could "facilitate meaningful analysis
of the incremental benefits of risk management alternatives.
252
On the basis of these suggestions, SAB asked EPA to rework the
sections of the report dealing with dose-response modeling and
overall risk assessment before submitting it to them for a final
review.
253
In September 2000, EPA formally submitted the re-worked por-
tions of its draft dioxin reassessment and the results of the peer
review process to the SAB.25 4 In addition to confirming the conclu-
sions found in the 1994 reassessment, the most recent draft re-clas-
sified mixtures of dioxins and related compounds as "likely human
carcinogens," while characterizing 2,3,7,8-TCDD (the most potent
and thoroughly studied of the dioxin compounds) as "carcino-
genic to humans. ' 255 The SAB formally endorsed the report in
June 2001, clearing the way for EPA to release it in final form.2 5 6
250. Id. at 5.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. ad at 4.
254. See EPA ExposuRE AND HumAN HALTH REASSESSMENT OF 2,3,7,8-TCDD, PT. III,
supra note 13.
255. Id. at 104.
256. See U.S. EPA, SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, DIOxiN REAsSESSMENT - AN SAB REVIEW
OF THE OmCE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT'S REASSESSMENT OF DIOxiN (2001). The SAB
review noted that almost half of the Panel's members did not support EPA's designation of
TCDD as a human carcinogen, while roughly a third of the Panel did support the classifica-
tion, with the remainder unwilling to take a position. Id. at 4. The SAB review, however,
acknowledged the profound (and perhaps irreducible) uncertainties confronting dioxin
science and the concomitant limits that this placed on EPA's ability to inform the public of
the magnitude of the health risks associated with dioxin and related compounds. In light
of this, the Panel concluded that "[s]ince neither knowledge breakthroughs nor fully de-
veloped and widely accepted techniques for producing improved risk assessment proce-
dures can be expected to be available in the near future.... the Agency [should] proceed
expeditiously to complete and release its Dioxin Risk Reassessment." Id. Employing lan-
gnage that echoed the precautionary principle, the Panel recommended further that
"[c]onsistent with sound environmental and public health policy, . . . EPA [should] con-
tinue to limit emissions and human exposure to this class of chemicals in view of the very
long biological and environmental persistence of these chemicals." Id.
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Yet, although the final version was scheduled for release in the fall
of 2001 (a full ten years after the process had begun), the Agency
still had not released it as of spring 2002.
2. The Cluster Rule.
During the latter half of the 1990s, at the same time that the
agency was working on the dioxin reassessment, EPA was also re-
viewing the so-called "cluster" rule for the pulp and paper industry.
In 1996, EPA announced that it was considering two options for its
bleaching requirements as part of the final rule.257 The first, sup-
ported by industry, called for complete substitution of chlorine di-
oxide for elemental chlorine.2 8 The second, based on EPA's
original 1993 proposal, called for oxygen delignification followed
by complete substitution of chlorine dioxide for elemental chlo-
rine.259 Based on data collected from various mills employing these
two processes, the agency noted that once the new rule went into
effect, dioxin levels in pulp mill effluent would be reduced by
ninety-five and ninety-nine percent respectively (depending on
which option was chosen).26° In a departure from previous regula-
tory models, EPA also suggested that its final rule would contain a
voluntary incentives program aimed at rewarding those mills that
exceeded regulatory requirements in reducing discharges.261 This
was a particularly welcome development for those mills that had
already installed oxygen delignification processes and were thus
worried that they might end up at a competitive disadvantage if this
particular process was not part of the new rule.262
257. See Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source
Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category, 61 Fed. Reg. 36,835 (July
15, 1996).
258. Id. at 36,838-39.
259. Id. The oxygen delignification process uses oxygen to reduce the lignin content
of unbleached pulp beyond that typically provided through conventional pulping
processes, thereby reducing the amount of chlorine (or other bleaching agent) necessary
to achieve "full market brightness" bleached pulp.
260. Id. at 36,841.
261. Id. at 36,849-58.
262. These incentives provisions appeared to result in part from the considerable
"stakeholder" input that EPA received on the development of the cluster rule as well as
from EPA's new thinking about "regulatory flexibility" as embodied in programs such as
Project XL. See id. Project XL is described at Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects,
60 Fed. Reg. 27,282-04 (May 23, 1995). In essence, projects approved under the Project XL
program would involve the exercise of "regulatory flexibility" by EPA in exchange for a
commitment on the part of the regulated entity to achieve better environmental results
than would have been attained through full compliance with all applicable regulations.
One bleached papergrade kraft mill was already participating in Project XL as of 1996.
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Environmental groups continued to press their call for a total
ban on chlorine in the bleaching process.263 In their view, no
amount of dioxin was permissive, particularly in light of the reas-
sessment.2 64 They saw the original 1993 proposal as a minimum
requirement thatwould provide a stepping stone to total chlorine-
free bleaching. 265 With EPA's 1996 announcement, some feared
that the agency was buckling under industry pressure.266 EPA, they
argued, had a mandate, to require the "best available technology"
to achieve environmental protection and total chlorine-free
bleaching was certainly available; a point that was hard to argue
with since a number of mills in Scandinavia and Europe had con-
verted to total chlorine-free (TCF) bleaching.267 Indeed, even in
Many of the voluntary incentives discussed in EPA's 1996 proposals for the duster rule fit
nicely with the overall thrust of Project XL.
263. This had been the basic position of a number of environmental groups since the
early 1990s. In 1993, for example, NRDC and fifty-five other environmental groups had
petitioned the EPA under the Clean Water Act to eliminate dioxin discharges from pulp
and paper production by prohibiting the use of chlorine as a bleaching agent. See PoWELL,
supra note 11, at 343. Likewise, Greenpeace, which had been involved in the issue since the
late 1980s, launched a major chlorine-free campaign in the mid-1990s to eliminate dioxin
from the waste streams of various industrial processes, including pulp and paper produc-
tion. See MICHELLE ALLSOPP, ACHIEVING ZERO DioxIN: AN EMERGENCY STRATEGY FOR DIOXIN
ELMINATION (1994).
264. In March 1997, environmental activists succeeded in getting Representative Jer-
old Nadler of NewYork to introduce legislation that would require pulp and paper firms to
achieve zero discharge of dioxin and dioxin-like compounds through the use of chlorine-
free bleaching within five years in order to be permitted for operation. See Glenn Hess,
Drawing the Curtain on the Cluster Rules and Moving to ECFBleaching 252 CHEM. MKrG. REP.,
Oct. 27, 1997, at 14. Admitting that his bill, the Chlorine Zero Discharge Act, faced an
uphill battle, representative Nadler contended that "the paper industry will tell you that
they should only be required to lower the amount of chlorine they use to undetectable
levels instead of a zero use level.... But until there is zero output of dioxin, we will be
risking our health and the health of our children. Quoted in id. See also Cindy Skrzycki, Pulp
Friction: The EPA 's Tussle Over Paper Pollutant Rules, WAsH. Posr, Apr. 11, 1997, at GI.
265. Reflecting the general disappointment in the environmental community over
EPA's unwillingness to push total chlorine free bleaching, Jessica Landman of the Natural
Resources Defense Council argued that "EPA is choosing between the first half and the
second half of the twentieth century in writing its pollution control rules for the pulp and
paper industry. We want twenty-first century technology." Quoted in Hess, supra note 264, at
14..
266. See Skrzycki, supra note 264.
267. See Skrzycki, supra note 264. TCF bleaching uses a combination of oxygen, hy-
drogen peroxide, and ozone as bleaching agents. Roughly one-third of Scandinavian and
Western European mills used TCF bleaching in the mid 1990s (with Scandinavia account-
ing for roughly sixty percent of global T.CF production), in part because the underlying
pulping technology (sulfite) made adoption of such bleaching processes easier. See Patrick
Fitzgerald, ECF Riding High, 248 CHEM. MKFG. REP., Nov. 6, 1995, at 15. In its 1996 Federal
Register notice announcing the two options for the cluster rule, the EPA stated that "It]he
limited range of papergrade TCF products currently produced and sold in the U.S. market
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the United States, Louisiana-Pacific's Samoa, California mill had
recently switched to TCF bleaching as part of a settlement with the
local Surfrider Foundation. 26" Given the right incentives, there was
no technical reason why pulp and paper production in the United
States could not be chlorine free.269
For its part, the industry continued to issue dire predictions of
the economic impact associated with the more restrictive ap-
proach.270 Labor unions also joined in fighting the more expensive
regulations. Here, in their view at least, was a classic example of the
so-called jobs-versus-environment tradeoff.27' EPA, they argued,
should consider the cost-effectiveness and economic impacts in
promulgating the new standards.272 As usual, EPA was caught in
the middle. Given the visibility of dioxin and the fact that the clus-
ter rule represented the agency's first attempt at "multi-media" reg-
ulation, the stakes were high.
In November 1997, EPA issued the final version of the cluster
rule.27' The industry got what it wanted-total substitution of chlo-
rine dioxide for chlorine with no additional requirement for oxy-
gen deliguification. 274 To reward those mills that had already
installed such processes as well as those that might do so in the
future, the new rule also included the voluntary incentives pro-
gram.275 In total, EPA estimated that the new rule would require
indicates that TCF technology is not yet available to make the full range of products pro-
duced by ECF [elemental chlorine free] or similar chlorine-based processes. Nonetheless,
EPA continues to strongly encourage further development and implementation of TCF
technologies and products. It is also probable that all TCF mills would qualify for the ad-
vanced technology incentives program.... [T]his should provide an opportunity to stimu-
late production and U.S. market share for TCF products." 61 Fed. Reg. 36,839 (Jul. 15,
1996). In effect, EPA did not consider TCF to be a sufficiently "available" technology to be
used as a basis for BAT regulations.
268. The settlement was part of a consent decree worked out with the U.S. Depart-
ment ofJustice. See Brad Knickerbocker, A Pulp Mill Comes Clean with Chlorine-Free Processing
CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Mar. 7, 1995, at 10.
269. See generally MAUREEN SMITH, THE U.S. PAPER INDUSTRY AND SUSTAINABLE PRODUC-
TION: AN ARGUMENT FOR RESTRUCTURING 120-32 (1997).
270. See Skrzycki, supra note 264; John H. Cushman, Jr., EPA Seeks Cut in Paper-Mill
Pollution, but Not Elimination, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,1997, at A21.
271. See Skrzycki, supra note 264.
272. See id.; Cushman, supra note 270.
273. The final air rules are at 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504 (Apr. 15, 1998) (codified at 40
G.FR. pts. 63, 261). The final water rules are at 63 Fed. Reg. 42,238 (Aug. 7, 1998) (codi-
fied at 40 G.F.R. pt. 430).
274. See 40 C.F.R pt. 430.
275. Id. The program is formally known as the Voluntary Advanced Technology In-
centives Program (VATIP). Mills that voluntarily enroll in the VATIP must comply with
more stringent wastewater regulations, and in exchange, have extra time to comply.
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$1.8 billion in capital expenditures.2 76 Dioxin levels in pulp mill
effluent would be reduced by ninety-six percent, which would even-
tually eliminate all dioxin-based fish advisories attributed to pulp
and paper mills.2 7 In announcing the new rule, EPA Administra-
tor Carol Browner stated that the agency was "taking significant
steps to protect the health of millions of American families from
contziminated air and water from pulp and paper mills," adding
that the action "puts us well on our way to cleaning up more than
seventy rivers and streams throughout the nation.
278
Environmental advocates expressed considerable dismay. Jes-
sica Landman, an attorney with the Natural 'Resources Defense
Fund, charged that the new "standards will allow the pulp and pa-
per industry to continue their routine contamination of our water-
ways," noting, ironically, that "[w] e have cost-effective technologies
readily available, but you would never know it from these stan-
dards. '279 Rick Hind of Greenpeace referred to the new rule as
"low-lead instead of no-lead gas. 280 In May 1998, the National
Wildlife Federation (NWF) and the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC), along with several local environmental groups,
filed a lawsuit against EPA in Maine, claiming that the new regula-
tions violated the Clean Water Act by not requiring Best Available
Technology (BAT) and demanding that EPA enact the more re-
strictive option reflected in the original 1993 proposal.28' In an-
nouncing the lawsuit, NWF President Mark Van Putten stated that
"EPA has the legal and moral obligation to protect people and the
environment from the dangers of these chemicals .... [It] does
not have the option of staying with the status quo simply because
the industry prefers it."'28 2 EPA staff defended the new rule, noting
that the original 1993 plan would have cost an extra $1.2 billion in
order to achieve an additional one percent reduction in dioxin dis-
276. See U.S. ENVrL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA's FINAL PULP, PAPER AND PAPERBOARD 'CLUS-
TER RULE'-OVERVIEW, EPA-821-F-97-010 (1997).
277. Id.
278. Press Release, U.S. EPA, EPA Eliminates Dioxin, Reduces Air and Water Pollu-
tants Form Nation's Pulp and Paper Mills (Nov. 14, 1997). While the tifle of the press
release suggested that the new rule would eliminate dioxin, the text stated more accurately
that it would "virtually eliminate dioxin discharges into waterways." Id. See also EPA's FINAL
PULP, PAPER AND PAPERBOARD 'CLUSTER RuL'-OvERviEw, supra note 276.
279. See EPA Orders $1.8 Billion Plan to Clean Up Mill's Discharges, WASH. POsT, Nov. 15,
1997, at A13.
280. Id.
281. See Press Release, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, Lawsuit to Challenge EPA Chlorine
Rules, (May 12, 1998), available at http://www.nwf.org/watersheds/lawsuiLt.htrl.
282. Id.
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charges.283 Clearly the agency did not consider this extra margin of
protection economically justified.
Pulp and paper firms were generally pleased with the final rule.
By the time it was issued, many companies were well on their way
towards compliance.28 4 Most firms expressed relief that they would
not be required to meet the more stringent standards. Industry gi-
ant Georgia Pacific, for example, referred to EPA's rule as a "rea-
sonable" and "right" choice for protecting the environment.28 5 The
American Forest & Paper Association applauded EPA's conclusion
"that a totally chlorine-free alternative was not a viable option."286
Meanwhile, the United Paperworkers International Union praised
the new rule for "protect[ing] the environment while minimizing
job loss in the pulp and paper industry."28 7 In short, the industry
and its allies succeeded in convincing the EPA that the more strin-
gent requirements contained in the original 1993 cluster rule pro-
posal constituted regulatory overkill. By taking voluntary steps to
reduce their dioxin discharges, they effectively got out in front of
the "regulatory curve," demonstrating to EPA and others that they
were willing and able to make changes.
2 88
3. Environmental politics.
Such actions may in fact mark a new, more proactive approach
by pulp and paper firms to environmental issues. To be sure, some
pulp and paper firms along with industry trade associations have
gone to great lengths during the last decade to emphasize their
newfound concern for "environmental stewardship."28 9 Corporate
environmentalism, it seems, has become standard rhetoric in the
industry. Some firms have even suggested the possibility of moving
to zero-discharge mills in the future as way of avoiding problems
283. Id.
284. By 1995, more than sixty percent of the industry had already made the transition
to chlorine dioxide (or elemental chlorine-free) bleaching technology. See Fitzgerald, supra
note 267, at 15. See also Hess, supra note 264, at 14.
285. Quoted in Cathy Cooper, For Pulp and Paper Mills, Reasonable Cluster Rules, 105
CHEM. ENG'G 45, 45 (1998).
286. Quoted in id..
287. Quoted in EPA Orders $1.8 Billion Plan, supra note 279.
288. PowE.L, supra note 11, at 366.
289. Through their industry trade association, pulp and paper firms agreed on a
number of new environmental initiatives in the late 1990s, including the Sustainable For-
estry Initiative (SFI) and an "Environmental Health & Safety Principles" program that re-
quires adherence to eight principles on environmental performance. For an overview, see
American Forest & Paper Assoc., Environmental Health & Safety Principles Progress Re-
port (2000), available at http://ww.afandpa.org/iinfo/iinfo.html.
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like the dioxin issue.29 ° Technological innovation aimed at
preventing pollution rather than simply controlling it has now be-
come an important point of discussion among managers and exec-
utives. Jerry Ballangee, an executive from Union Camp, recently
predicted that "a no-discharge plant is a very attractive proposition
and at some point we will get there. '291 R.L. Erickson, vice presi-
dent for manufacturing and technology at Weyerhaeuser made a
similar point: "We had dioxin in 1987. What will it be in 2005? By
closing the loop, you can prevent future issues. "292 Members of the
environmental community, however, are somewhat skeptical of the
industry's recent "greening," suggesting that until there are tangi-
ble results the whole effort is little more than a sophisticated public
relations ploy-"greenwashing" they call it.
293
Still, the dioxin issue clearly has affected the industry's ap-
proach to environmental regulation and it may mark a significant
departure from the industry's more recalcitrant approach to other
environmental issues in the past. Whether or not this will result in
more or better environmental protection in the future is not clear.
There can be little doubt, though, that the industry's initial "coop-
erative" approach to the dioxin issue gave it considerable input
into the regulatory process. 294 By working with EPA rather than
fighting the agency at every turn, the industry gained a certain ac-
cess to regulators that it had never enjoyed in the past. Such access
allowed the industry to constantly challenge dioxin science and tie
costs and benefits associated with various regulatory options,
thereby shaping the outcome.
This is not to suggest, however, that the industry succeeded in
getting everything it wanted or that EPA was somehow co-opted.
Indeed, environmental groups, though perhaps unhappy with the
final results, were also quite successful in shaping the process from
the very beginning. By making dioxin a major public issue in the
late 1980s, they effectively put the industry on the defensive. By
forcing EPA to accept a legally-imposed timeline for developing di-
oxin regulations for pulp and paper discharges, they set the regula-
tory train in motion. Throughout it all, moreover, these
environmental groups, like the industry, pushed for a particular
290. SeeJohn Holusha, Pulp Mills Turn Over a New Leaf N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1996, at
A35.
291. Quoted in id.
292. Quoted in id.
293. See Kenny Bruno, Greenwash Inc., SIERRA 86, No. 3, 2001, at 82.
294. See Thompson & Graham, supra note 109, at 254-59.
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interpretation of dioxin science that bolstered their own regulatory
agenda.
This is quite simply the nature of contemporary environmental
politics, where interest groups of various persuasions cultivate ac-
cess and push their cause with regulatory officials. Given the high
stakes and immediacy of the questions being asked combined with
the considerable scientific uncertainty associated with efforts to
quantify toxic harms, the policy discourse almost inevitably de-
volves into intractable disputes between basic principles. On one
side are those seeking to ground regulation on the precautionary
principle, which effectively presumes harm until proven otherwise.
On the other side are those pushing for "complete" certainty, effec-
tively assuming no harm until proven otherwise. The overall result
of this conflict in the dioxin case has been a significant reduction,
though not elimination, of dioxin discharges from pulp and paper
mills.29 Is it enough or too much? That depends, of course, on
whom you ask.
IV. CONTROLLING Toxic HARMs
The social control of toxic harms represents one of the more
difficult challenges facing modem industrial society. Aside from
the scientific and technical complexities endemic to toxics issues,
the diversity of parties involved combined with the financial inter-
ests at stake create a deeply politicized situation. To date, tort and
regulation have provided the primary tools for responding to tox-
ics issues. As the preceding study of dioxin contamination in the
pulp and paper industry suggests, however, these existing tools fail
to deal adequately with the unique problems posed by toxic harms.
Two obvious questions emerge from this conclusion: (1) Why are
existing tools inadequate? and (2) What sorts of alternative institu-
tional arrangements are necessary to develop a more effective ap-
proach to toxic harms? This section addresses these questions.
A. Tort-Based Approaches
The chief advantage of tort law as a remedial approach to toxic
harms lies in the precision that it supposedly offers in redressing
harms to individual plaintiffs-something that regulation simply
cannot provide. In the case of toxic pollutants resulting in poten-




tial mass exposure, however, the tort system does not seem to be
particularly well equipped to provide such remedies. Common crit-
icisms of mass tort litigation include the arbitrary nature of the re-
sults; the failure to deliver compensation to real victims when they
need it; misallocation of risk among consumers, corporations, and
government; massive waste; and failure to achieve anything re-
motely resembling corrective justice.296 As the proliferation of mass
torts has grown to the point of threatening the carrying capacity of
the federal docket, the most common refrain appears to be how
ineffective and wasteful the system has become. As one scholar put
it: "the field known as 'mass torts' comprises a melange of discrete
disputes with little in common besides their prodigious procedural
complexity, stratospheric transaction costs, and abject dependence
on uncertain science."29  Such shortcomings derive principally
from three major areas of difficulty: (1) proving causation in the
face of scientific uncertainty; (2) utilizing theories of liability devel-
oped for very different sorts of injuries; and (3) scaling up from
two party disputes to multi-party actions dealing with mass expo-
sure. While none of these areas of difficulty is necessarily insur-
mountable in its own right, when taken together they pose a
formidable barrier to anyone seeking to use the tort system to deal
with a problem as complex as dioxin.
Proving that a particular toxic substance such as dioxin caused
an actual injury requires that a plaintiff establish both general and
specific causation-that is, it requires that the plaintiff show that
the substance in question is capable of causing the kind of injury
296. See Peter H. Shuck, Mass Torts: An InstitutionalEvolutionist Perspective 80 CoRN'ma
L. REv. 941, 942 (1995); see also Robert L. Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Tort System,
24 Hous. L. REv. 27 (1987). Rabin's article focuses specifically on the distinctive problems
associated with pursuing tort actions in the context of harm deriving from toxic pollutants.
In addition to problems of identifying the precise source of harm and establishing manage-
able boundaries to the litigation, Rabin points to the seemingly intractable problems of
causation (what he refers to as identification) in the toxic pollution context, noting that
[t]oxics of all sorts-impure water, hazardous chemicals, defective synthetics-
often breed disease rather than cause immediate injury. As a consequence, the
tort system is severely tested. Since diseases do not occur instantaneously, there
are serious time-lag issues. And because diseases are frequently a product of the
background risks of living (or at least intertwined with those risks), technical in-
formation is essential to establish attribution. Thus, identification, ordinarily a rou-
tine issue of cause in fact at common law, is a costly enterprise that relies on types
of evidence and probability judgments which can be regarded as ill-suited to
traditional resolution through the adversary process.
Id. at 29.
297. SCHUCK, supra note 296, at 942.
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that he allegedly suffered (general causation) and that his expo-
sure to the substance from a particular source was of sufficient du-
ration and amount to cause his injury (specific causation) .2 9
Establishing general causation in toxic torts generally involves pro-
ducing scientific evidence sufficient to draw a probabilistic infer-
ence that the product or substance was capable of causing the
health effects in question. 299 This is essentially a risk assessment,
and it is one of the most contested (if not the most contested)
features of toxic tort litigation. Ideally, general causation should be
expressed as the probability of harm resulting from a given expo-
sure expressed in the form of a "dose-response" curve.300 This is
difficult, however, because it invariably relies on proxies and de-
fault assumptions to get from available data to actual conditions. 1
A very rough hierarchy of methods includes human epidemiologi-
cal studies, animal studies, and structure-activity relationship analy-
ses.10 2 Each of these has its own problems, and the issues are
addressed widely in the risk assessment literature. Briefly, epidemi-
ological studies are usually unavailable, especially in cases involving
serious time lags between exposure and disease. In the case of toxic
substances, moreover, the combination of underlying study-design
biases, confounding factors, and uneven data quality can generate
causal associations that may not actually exist.3"' Animal testing
data, which provide the most common empirical basis for most risk
assessments, must be extrapolated from higher to lower doses (due
to time and statistical limitations of controlled studies), and trans-
lated to humans. 3 °4 Structure-activity relationship analyses and
298. See In reJoint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995)
("Causation in toxic torts normally comprises two separate inquiries: whether the epidemi-
ological or other scientific evidence establishes a causal link between c (asbestos exposure)
and d (colon cancer), and whether plaintiff is within the class of persons to which infer-
ences from the general causation evidence should be applied.")
299. For a discussion of general causation, see Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General
Causation: Notes Toward a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2117
(1997).
300. See Arthur C. Upton, Carcinogenic Risk Assessment in Proper Perspective, 4 ToxicoL-
oCY & INDUS. HE.ALT 443 (1988); Carole A. Kimmel, Quantitative Approaches to Human Risk
Assessment for Noncancer Health Effects, 11 NEUROTOXICOLOGY 189 (1990). See also the discus-
sion and references regarding risk assessment, infra Part III.B.
301. Id.
302. For a discussion of these various techniques in the context of EPA's carcinogen
risk assessment, see U.S. EPA, GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT (1999).
303. See Gary Taubes, Epidemiologt Faces its Limits, 269 Sci. 164, 164-69 (1995) (discuss-
ing the many uncertainties that plague epidemiological studies, particularly in the toxics
area).
304. See Richard Wilson & E.A.C. Crouch, Risk Assessment and Comparisons: An Intro-
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models can be suggestive, but they are usually considered inade-
quate in the absence of corroborating empirical evidence.
30 5
Assuming that sufficient evidence exists to establish general
causation, individual plaintiffs still have to establish that they were
exposed to the substance in question, that their exposure resulted
from the defendant's activity, and that the exposure caused their
particular injury. This is often very difficult in cases involving toxic
pollution, which often entail reliance on mathematical modeling
of plumes and statistical techniques as a basis for inferring the
probability that the plaintiff suffered exposure from the defen-
dant's pollution. Indeed, absent a major chemical disaster result-
ing in immediate exposure of large numbers of individuals,
plaintiffs commonly face great difficulties proving specific causa-
tion in cases where adverse health effects ostensibly arise from in-
dustrial pollution. This is especially true in the case of dioxin given
existing "background" concentrations of dioxin in human tissues,
the lack of any signature disease from dioxin, and the general diffi-
culties involved in attributing common diseases to specific environ-
mental risks.
In sum, establishing "causation" for toxic harm requires that
the plaintiff show (a) that the toxic substance is capable of causing
harm (and, ideally, mapping out exactly when and how much
harm it causes as a function of exposure or dose), and (b) that the
toxic substance did cause harm in this particular case, which re-
quires showing exposure of sufficient magnitude to have caused
the plaintiffs particular injury. As suggested, such difficulties are
particularly burdensome in the case of dioxin because, unlike as-
bestos or DES, where causation can be bolstered by the presence of
signature diseases, dioxin could be implicated in a whole host of
health effects-none of which are exclusive to the compound.
When one recognizes that dioxin is one of the most intensively
studied of all known toxic compounds, the challenges of proving
causation in other pollution-based toxic torts seem insurmount-
able.
duction, 236 Sci. 267, 268-69 (1987) (discussing the problems involved in extrapolating
from animal studies to humans); see also Bruce N. Ames, et al., Ranking Possible Carcinogenic
Hazards, 236 ScI. 271, 271-80 (1987) (discussing the utility of animal studies as a basis for
ranking rather than predicting human risks); John H. Weisburger & Gary M. Williams,
Carcinogen Testing. Current Problems and New Approaches, 214 Sci. 401, 401-7 (1981) (discuss-
ing the problems with animal studies and the emergence of new approaches focusing on
the mechanisms of carcinogenesis).
305. See EPA GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 302, at 2-18.
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Such difficulties are compounded further by prevailing eviden-
tiary standards. Indeed, given the Supreme Court's recent rulings
on the admissibility of scientific evidence in the Daubert line of
cases, 30 6 and the fact that so little is known about so many toxic
compounds, it is not at all clear that expert testimony would be
admissible in many toxic tort cases. 7 Although efforts to keep so-
called 'junk science" from being admitted into evidence should be
encouraged, some scholars have argued that courts should relax
the Daubert requirements in the toxics area and "recognize the
wider range of reliable toxicological evidence that scientists utilize
to conclude that substances are known or likely human toxicants
or carcinogens. '308  By raising the bar on the type of evidence
needed to establish general causation, they argue, Daubert rein-
forces existing incentives on the part of defendants to emphasize
306. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiring the
trial judge to perform a "gate-keeping" role to ensure that expert scientific testimony is not
only relevant but also reliable, which the court defined as properly grounded in the "meth-
ods and procedures of science"); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (establish-
ing an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing trial judge determination of expert
qualifications); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extending the Daubert
principles and requirements to "technical" experts).
307. For a discussion of the emerging difficulties posed by Daubert and its progeny for
toxic torts in the products area, see Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientfl Ignorance
and Reliable Patterns of Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is There a Need for Liability Reform, 64
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2001).
308. Id. at 45. Peter Huber has been the most persistent critic of what he calls "junk"
science in mass toxic tort litigation. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEo's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE
IN THE COURTROOM (1991). See also KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER JUDGING SCI-
ENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS (1997); DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL
ALCHEM. THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW (1999). For a case study on the use
and abuse of science in toxic tort litigation, see MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE
CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT LITIGATION (1996). She-
lia Jasanoff criticizes the assumption that there exists an easily identifiable domain of
knowledge known as "mainstream science." See SHELAJASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR LAw,
SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA, 207 (1995). As she puts it,
[c] ontrary to the professed beliefs of many in science and industry, good science
is not a commodity that courts can conveniently shop for in some extrasocietal
marketplace of pure knowledge. There is no way for the law to access a domain of
facts untouched by values or social interests. Scientific claims that are imported
into the legal process are colored not only by the interests of the offering parties
but also by the social, cultural, and political commitments of other actors in soci-
ety: for example, the reluctance of experts to breach disciplinary solidarity, the
law's desire to cloak morally difficultjudgments with the 'objective' authority of
experts and instruments, and the public's demand for decisions that seem both.
open and rational. Historically, sociologically, and politically, the proposal that
courts should increase their reliance on value-neutral mainstream science is
therefore extremely problematic.
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ignorance and uncertainty in the face of claims that their activities
have resulted in toxic harms.
309
While proving causation in a world of toxic ignorance repre-
sents the greatest challenge facing toxic tort plaintiffs, existing lia-
bility rules also pose a number of constraints. This is particularly
true in the case of toxic pollutants. Indeed, in contrast to the more
conducive theories of liability developed in the products area-
strict liability for manufacturing defects, responsibility to adopt rea-
sonable alternative designs in the case of design defects, and a gen-
eral duty to warn of foreseeable risks of harm3 1 0-polluting firms
generally need only show that their behavior was reasonable (and
lawful) to avoid tort liability. More importantly, there is no general
duty to warn in the pollution context.311 As suggested in Part II, to
309. See Cranor & Eastmond, supra note 307, at 14-16 (arguing that "[flack of scien-
tific knowledge... invites a defendant whose substance is challenged as harmful to utilize
ignorance as a means to avoid liability"); See also Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General
Causation: Notes Toward a New Theory ofjustice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2117, 2119
(1997) (arguing that the general causation requirement in toxic tort litigation combined
with the fact of toxic ignorance "creates incentives on the part of corporations not to know
and not to disclose").
310. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUWS LIABILITY § 2 (1998):
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manu-
facturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate in-
structions or warnings. A product: (a) contains a manufacturing defect when the
product departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exer-
cised in the preparation and marketing of the product; (b) is defective in design
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been re-
duced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller
or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution,
and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe; (c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and
the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably
safe.
311. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODuCrs LLABiLrr §2, cmt. i (1998):
In addition to alerting users and consumers to the existence and nature of prod-
uct risks so that they can, by appropriate conduct during use or consumption,
reduce the risk of harm, warnings also may be needed to inform users and con-
sumers of nonobvious and not generally known risks that unavoidably inhere in
using or consuming the product. Such warnings allow the user or consumer to
avoid the risk warned against by making an informed decision not to purchase or
use the product at all and hence not to encounter the risk. In this context, warn-
ings must be provided for inherent risks that reasonably foreseeable product
users and consumers would reasonably deem material or significant in deciding
whether to use or consume the product. Whether or not many persons would,
when warned, nonetheless decide to use or consume the product, warnings are
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the extent that the activity in question is considered "abnormally
dangerous," plaintiffs can argue for strict liability, but such causes
of action would be exceptional in a modern industrial economy.1
12
This leaves negligence as the basic liability rule for personal injury
claims resulting from the vast majority of toxic pollutants. In con-
trast to products liability-where the plaintiff need only show a de-
fective design and/or inadequate warning-the negligence regime
applied in the pollution context requires the far more difficult
showing of unreasonable behavior on the part of the defendant. In
the case of dioxin contamination from pulp and paper production,
this would presumably require a showing that a particular facility
or company acted unreasonably relative to the practices of the sec-
tor or the business community as a whole. Given the standardized
nature of the technology and the extensive automation in the pulp
and paper sector, this appears to be a rather difficult case to make.
Moreover, even if a plaintiff attempted to claim that the industry as
a whole acted unreasonably with respect to dioxin contamination,
the fact that the issue was not even known until the mid 1980s com-
bined with the industry's considerable efforts to assess the actual
extent of the problem and its efforts to shift to less chlorine-inten-
sive bleaching processes suggests the difficulties involved in show-
ing negligence.
Given their inability to demonstrate any actual physical injury
associated with exposure, dioxin plaintiffs, like many others in the
toxic tort area, also sought to establish liability for intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, arguing that fear of fu-
ture illness constituted sufficient grounds for liability. As noted,
however, courts have been less than enthusiastic about such causes
of action, especially in the absence of any manifestation of physical
injury. This left trespass and nuisance as the residual theories of
required to protect the interests of those reasonably foreseeable users or consum-
ers who would, based on their own reasonable assessments of the risks and bene-
fits, decline product use or consumption. When such warnings are necessary,
their omission renders the product not reasonably safe at time of sale. Notwith-
standing the defective condition of the product in the absence of adequate warn-
ings, if a particular user or consumer would have decided to use or consume even
if warned, the lack of warnings is not a legal cause of that plaintiffs harm.Judicial
decisions supporting the duty to provide warnings for informed decisionmaking
have arisen almost exclusively with regard to those toxic agents and pharmaceuti-
cal products with respect to which courts have recognized a distinctive need to
provide risk information so that recipients of the information can decide whether
they wish to purchase or utilize the product.
312. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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liability for many dioxin plaintiffs. Although trespass and nuisance
claims for damages from dioxin contamination of property did in-
deed turn out to be more viable than the personal injury and emo-
tional distress claims, they have inherent limits as tools for dealing
with toxic harms. The site-specific nature of these claims limits
their ability to deter the production of toxic substances on a large
scale. More important, trespass and nuisance obviously have noth-
ing at all to offer in the way of compensation for plaintiffs who
have or will suffer health effects associated with exposure to toxic
substances. As doctrines that emerged out of two-party disputes
over property rights, such causes of action are ill equipped for the
complex world of toxic harms.
Finally, efforts to scale the tort system from simple two-party
disputes to mass toxic exposures raise a number of serious proce-
dural concerns regarding treatment of individual plaintiffs (pre-
sent and future). As several commentators have argued, the story
of mass torts is in many ways a story about procedure. 313 Procedural
questions and choices, in other words, have been fundamental in
shaping the emergence of the mass tort in the toxics area. Aggrega-
tion of claims, in this view, derived largely from the desperate ef-
forts of judges to develop standardized procedures that would
lower the transactions costs associated with mass exposure cases. As
these torts "matured," judges, defendants, and plaintiffs lawyers all
came to see the advantages of settling these cases as a group. The
class action became a vehicle both for resolving the federalism di-
lemmas embedded in mass exposure claims and for giving defend-
ants and courts the repose that they desired. 14 Because of the
procedural complexities inherent in the class action approach to
toxic torts, however, opportunities for collusion and abuse abound.
As John Coffee argues, "the mass tort class action is uniquely vul-
nerable to the danger of collusion." '15 During the 1990s, according
313. See DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACFION DIEMMAs: PURSUING PUBuC GOALS
FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000); see alsoJohn C. Coffee,Jr., Class Wars: TheDilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 CoLuM. L. Rxv. 1343 (1995).
314. See HENSLER ET A.., supra note 313, at 11-25, 79-114.
315. See Coffee, supra note 313, at 1349. Coffee points to the perverse incentives that
emerge in the class action context, noting that "[n]o opening generalization about the
modem class action is sounder than the assertion that it has long been a context in which
opportunistic behavior has been common and high agency costs have prevailed. If not
actually collusive, non-adversarial settlements have all too frequently advanced only the
interests of plaintiff's attorneys, not those of the class members." Id at 1347-48. Coffee goes
on to note that because "courts have little ability or incentive to resist the settlements that
the parties in class action litigation reach," there is no real mechanism for accountability.
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to Coffee, the class action evolved into a vehicle that provided de-
fendants with a variety of procedures to minimize their tort liabili-
ties.316 Once a sword for plaintiffs, the modern class action (at least
in the tort context) became a shield for defendants." 7 In Coffee's
view, this "new legal technology"-manifest most prominently in
the use of mandatory classes, settlement classes, and future claim-
ant classes-worked to "create a new, even more protective form of
limited liability for corporations." '
In the cases involving dioxin contamination from pulp and pa-
per production, the procedural inadequacies of the class action
technique seemed readily apparent. After the initial successes in
Mississippi, plaintiffs' lawyers in a number of states rushed to file
ever-larger class action suits against pulp and paper firms, seeking
to capitalize on the growing wave of anxiety associated with dioxin.
Most of these suits settled relatively quickly for several million dol-
lars apiece. In return, many of the defendant companies were re-
leased from future liability. Although the details of the individual
settlements were not disclosed, one can presume that the
thousands of plaintiffs saw relatively little in the way of compensa-
tion. More important, the whole question of future claimants
seems to have been largely ignored in these settlements, raising
serious questions about the ability of the tort system to deliver real
compensation to victims of toxic harms if and when they actually
suffer injury.
B. Regulation and the Dilemmas of Risk Assessment
Just as the tort system does not deal well with mass toxic expo-
sure cases, so the regulatory system (at least as currently consti-
tuted) has proven limited in its capacity to respond quickly to the
emergence of new toxic harms. The fact that it took more than ten
years from the time dioxin was first identified in pulp mill effluent
to the time that a final regulation was promulgated illustrates how
slow and cumbersome the regulatory system can be in dealing with
problems of this complexity. Obviously there are many factors that
can delay the regulatory process. In the toxics area, however, such
Id. at 1348. In his view, these constraints on the court stem from (1) the threat of docket
overload; (2) inability to control attorney's fees in the face of out-of-court settlements; and
(3) client passivity. Id at 1349.
316. According to Coffee, these procedures constituted "a new legal technology, the
impact of which uniquely disadvantages future claimants." Id.
317. Id.
318. Id at 1461.
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problems often derive from the presence of scientific uncertainty
and the contested role of risk assessment in setting regulatory
priorities.
This is not intended to suggest that the practice of risk assess-
ment is an inappropriate basis for toxics regulation. Rather, the
point is simply to recognize the fact that risk assessment as prac-
ticed in the real world often reinforces a dynamic of politicization
that can hinder efforts to control toxic harms. Thus, it is important
to consider not only what risk assessment can and cannot do but
also how it has evolved and what functions it performs in the con-
text of the contemporary administrative state.
Given its obvious appeal as an administrative technique, the
practice of quantitative risk assessment has, over the last two de-
cades, come to occupy a very prominent place in EPA's approach
to environmental protection. Beginning in the early 1980s and
reaching a climax under William Reilly, top EPA officials expressed
growing enthusiasm and support for the potential of risk assess-
ment (and its sibling risk management) to reshape agency prac-
tices and environmental policy more generally.3 19 In part, this
stemmed from a broader effort in the federal bureaucracy to ra-
tionalize the practice of risk assessment across the various agen-
cies.3 2° These officials wanted to introduce more systematic "risk-
319. Together, risk assessment and risk management make up risk analysis. As de-
fined at EPA, risk assessment proceeds in four steps: (1) hazard assessment, which deter-
mines whether a particular agent is linked causally with a given health effect; (2) dose-
response assessment, which seeks to determine the quantitative relation between exposure
to a certain dose-level of the agent in question and the incidence and/or severity of a
response in test animals; (3) exposure assessment, which seeks to determine the popula-
tion(s) exposed to the agent in question and the routes, magnitudes, frequencies, and
durations of exposure; and (4) risk characterization, which attempts to characterize or
summarize the nature of the risk in light of uncertainties involved and major assumptions
employed. See Milton Russell & Michael Gruber, Risk Assessment in Environmental Policy-Mak-
ing, 236 Sci. 286-90 (1987). In principle, risk assessment is supposed to be separate from
risk management, which is the process by which a regulatory agency such as EPA decides
what to do with the results of a risk assessment. In practice, however, such a separation is
not always possible. See Richard Andrews, Risk-Based Decision Making in ENVIRONMENTAL POL-
ICY IN THE 1990s, 209-31 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2d ed. 1994).
320. In 1983, the National Research Council (NRC) published a report recom-
mending that federal regulatory agencies adopt more consistent and uniform risk assess-
ment practices, including "inference guidelines" to better ensure the technical quality of
risk assessments and preserve its "scientific" basis. The NRC report also recommended a
basic framework for risk assessment composed of four basic steps: hazard identification;
dose-response assessment; exposure assessment; and risk characterization. See NAT'L RE-
SEARCH CouNcir., RisK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1984). EPA
responded to this recommendation with a set of risk assessment guidelines in 1986, Guide-
lines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (Sept. 24, 1986), which set forth
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based" decision procedures throughout the agency, thereby mov-
ing EPA away from its former "patchwork" of responsibilities for
implementing particular environmental statutes toward a more co-
herent mission that would be defined by risk priorities.321 Scientific
experts would assume unprecedented power and authority in iden-
tifying these priorities.3 2 2 The whole effort promised to ground
specific environmental policies, such as dioxin standards, in scien-
tific analysis.123 "Good science" became a mantra for those who
hoped to put EPA on more "rational foundations. 3 24 Hazards
would be reduced to some common calculus of expected harm or
death, compared to one another, and ranked. Standard algorithms
would be developed for particular sets of risks. Inference guide-
lines and default assumptions would be systematically applied. On
the basis of such risk characterization, cost-benefit analysis would
principles and procedures to guide EPA scientists in assessing the cancer risks from chemi-
cals and other agents in the environment. The NRC published another report in 1994,
offering an updated set of guidelines for refining risk assessment practices. See NAT'L RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT (1994). In 1996, EPA pub-
lished a revised set of cancer risk guidelines, Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk
Assessment 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960 (Apr. 23, 1996). These proposed guidelines have subse-
quently been subjected to extensive public comment and peer review, including three re-
views by EPA's Science Advisory Board. Based on this input EPA issued draft revised
guidelines in July 1999. U.S. EPA, GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT (July
1999). In November 2001, the agency announced its intent to issue final revised guidelines
for Carcinogenic Risk Assessment in 2002. See 66 Fed. Reg. 59,593 (Nov. 29, 2001). These
guidelines are intended to be used in conjunction with other risk assessment guidelines
developed by the agency since the mid-1980s, including guidelines for exposure assess-
ment, chemical mixtures, developmental toxicity, mutagenicity, reproductive toxicants,
and neurotoxicity.
321. For important EPA statements on risk assessment and its relationship to the
agency's mission, see U.S. EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987), and U.S. EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, REDUCING RISK: SET-
TING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990).
322. In many respects, this is the mandate envisioned for EPA's Science Advisory
Board (SAB). See EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, REDUCING RISK, supra note 321. For one of
the more prominent articulations of this view, see STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIm RISK REGULATION (1992) (arguing for a new centralized admin-
istrative group charged with rationalizing the practice of risk assessment and the practice
of ranking risk priorities across the federal bureaucracy). For a critical review of Breyer's
proposal, see Sheila Jasanoff, The Dilemmas of Risk Regulation, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 79, 80
(Spring 1994) (identifying "the book's greatest conceptual weakness [as] its unthinking
embrace of a vision of rationality based on closely held and impartial technical expertise").
See also SheilaJasanoff, Science, Politics, and the Renegotiation of Expertise at EPA, 7 OSIRIS, 2d
Series, 195-217 (1992); RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLCY 268-70 (1999).
323. See U.S. EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS; U.S. EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, REDUC-
ING RISK, supra note 321.
324. U.S. EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, REDUCING RISK, supra note 321.
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then be used to evaluate various regulatory options.325 From the
perspective of pure administrative efficiency and in the context of
limited resources, the goal seemed worthy enough.
Yet, there are a number of problems with such an approach. As
suggested in the previous section, any attempt to assess the risks
and calculate expected losses from some sort of environmental dis-
turbance, such as dioxin contamination, entails assumptions about
physiological, toxicological, and/or ecological processes (causal
mechanisms) that are often not well understood.326 Tremendous
uncertainties are also encountered in any effort to extrapolate
from high-dose exposure to low-dose exposure and from responses
in animals to responses in humans.327 Moreover, difficulties in un-
derstanding latent effects and latency periods, special sensitivities
in exposed populations, synergistic effects with other substances,
and temporal and spatial variability in exposure levels threaten to
overwhelm any claims of being complete and accurate enough to
be reliable. 28 Reducing risks to a common calculus (e.g., excess
cancer deaths) obviously leaves out or downplays other sorts of
health risks (e.g., immune system impairment, neurotoxicity, etc.)
that may not lend themselves as easily to quantification.3 29 The
purely aggregate approach to risk, by focusing on averages or
means, also tends to ignore the maximally exposed population.330
Finally, different agencies and even different divisions within the
same agency often employ different models, assumptions, and ap-
proaches to risk assessment.
331
325. For a discussion of the rise of economic analyses at EPA, and their relation to
risk assessment, see ECONOMIc ANALYSES AT EPA- ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACr (Richard
D. Morgenstem ed., 1997). For an argument in favor of comparative risk assessment, see
the collection of essays in RISK VS. RisK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT (John D. Graham &John B. Weiner eds., 1995).
326. See Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALEJ.
REG. 89, 91-92 (1988). See also Donald T. Hornstein, ReclaimingEnvironmental Law: A Norma-
tive Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. RE,. 562, at 571-72 (1992); Thornton,
supra note 8, at 420-21.
327. See Wilson & Crouch, supra note 304; Ames et al., supra note 304; Weisburger &
Williams, supra note 304.
328. See Taubes, supra note 303; see also Crosby, supra note 4, at 143-61.
329. The difficulties of assessing the variety of health risks associated with toxic sub-
stances such as dioxin are reflected in EPA's efforts to develop guidelines for neurotoxicity,
mutagenicity, developmental toxicity, etc. as complements to its guidelines on carcino-
genic risks. See discussion and references supra note 320.
330. See Latin, supra note 326. EPA has endeavored to account for highly-exposed
populations in its dioxin risk assessment. See EPA ExPosuRE AND HuMAN HEALTu REASSESS-
MENT OF 2,3,7,8-TCDD, PT. III, supra note 13, at 73-76.
331. See Latin, supra note 326; see also Hornstein, supra note 326; Andrews, supra note
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Quantitative risk assessment, in short, has never been able to
provide a simple protocol for translating "good science" into risk
predictions. Even former administrator William Ruckleshaus, a ma-
jor proponent of risk assessment, realized its inherent limitations.
He knew that risk assessment would always be plagued with uncer-
tainties that required all sorts of assumptions. 32 Not surprisingly,
the practice of risk assessment has often elicited considerable con-
troversy, sometimes degenerating into a highly politicized process,
with various interests lining up their own experts, their own "sci-
ence," to support a particular approach or conclusion. As in other
areas of environmental policy, this has led to charges of over- and
under-regulation, increasing distrust for regulatory agencies, and
political balkanization.
Despite all of the political controversy, however, risk assessment
continues to hold considerable attraction for many regulators. In-
deed, when seen in a larger context, the appeal of risk assessment
stems largely from its capacity to act as an "organizing technology"
of immense reach. At'the most basic level, risk assessment operates
as a schema of rationality-a method of breaking down, re-arrang-
ing and ordering various elements of the world. Part of its attrac-
tion rests in the fact that it entails a distinctive political economy of
knowledge; a new dependency on experts and expert systems. By
319. In his recent history of environmental policy, Richard Andrews criticized the risk as-
sessment approach at EPA as an attempt to use "scientific language to mask fundamentally
political decisions, and to allow policy to be controlled by an EPA subgovernment rather
than by a broader political process." Andrews, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note
322, at 269.
332. See William D. Ruckelshaus, Science, Risk, and Public Policy, 221 Sci. 1026, 1026-28.
Ruckelshaus noted that "the formal assessment of risk" represented one of the most "troub-
lesome" examples of the "dissonance between science and the creation of public policy."
Id., at 1026. In his view, this stemmed largely from the inevitable conflict between irreduci-
ble scientific uncertainties and the demand for certainty reflected in many environmental
laws. Id. Although he pushed for a more formal and coordinated approach to risk assess-
ment in EPA and throughout the federal government, Ruckeshaus was quite realistic
about the limits of risk assessment:
when we examine the premises on which... estimates of risk are based, we find a
confusing picture. In assessing a suspected carcinogen, for example, there are
uncertainties at every point where an assumption must be made: in calculating
exposure; in extrapolating from high doses where we have seen an effect to the
low doses typical of environmental pollution; in what we may expect when
humans are subject to much lower doses of a substance that, when given in high
doses, caused tumors in laboratory animals, and finally, in the very mechanisms
by which we suppose the disease works. One thing we clearly need to do is ensure
that our laws-reflect these scientific uncertainties.
Id. at 1027.
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putting a price on health, by making lives fungible, risk assessment
and risk management are part of a broader "technology of power"
in the modem administrative state. As such, they represent ratio-
nalized ways of coping with the hazards generated by industrial so-
ciety.33 3 In the process, they can determine, quite literally, the
difference between life and death.
Inevitably, though, no matter how rational or scientific such
practices appear, the use of risk assessment in environmental pol-
icy becomes politicized. Arguments about the assumptions built
into risk assessment and the procedures used often serve as surro-
gates for arguments about the real issues. Similarly, the disconnect
between irreducible scientific uncertainties on the one hand, and
the legal system's demand for certitude and precision on the other,
creates ample opportunities for conflict between competing inter-
est groups. This can lead to costly delays and politically compro-
mised results.
In its dioxin reassessment, EPA hoped to circumvent some of
these problems by opening up the process to a broad community
of scientists-one of the reasons why the reassessment has taken so
much longer than initially expected. This ultimately proved to be
an important decision. Indeed, despite the delays, EPA's move to
open up the process served to blunt the criticisms of those who
charged the agency with running a closed process. More impor-
tant, the resulting reassessment has been widely seen as a stronger
document because of the process.
In sum, while risk assessment clearly has a central role to play in
any effort to identify and control toxic harms, it is important to
recognize the ways in which it gets mobilized in the political strug-
gle over toxics regulation. The many scientific disciplines that in-
form toxic risk assessment will always be subject to uncertainty.
While the scientific process should continue to play a major role in
informing toxics policy, it should not be fetishized in a way that
effectively trumps alternative efforts to control the toxic byprod-
ucts of industrial production systems.
C. Alternative Information-Based Approaches
What, then, might an alternative approach look like? If one ac-
333. For a broader, social-theoretic perspective on risk and risk assessment, see
ULRICH BECK, RISK SocIErYw ToWNARDS A NEW MODERNITY (Sage ed., 1992) and Francois
Ewald, Insurance and Risk, in THE FOUCAULT ErcT: STUDIES IN GOvERNMENTALrry 197-210
(Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
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cepts the premise that the current system is deeply flawed and per-
haps incapable of effectively controlling toxic harms, the
appropriate place to focus is institutional design. In focusing on
institutional design, moreover, attention should be directed to pro-
cess rather than substance. While this essay hardly claims to offer a
comprehensive alternative, this final section suggests three poten-
tial .institutional design changes-each of which draws on existing
innovations and ideas-that might bolster efforts to develop an al-
ternative approach to the social control of toxic harms. These in-
clude mandatory disclosure; stronger facility-level monitoring of
toxics releases; and a sector-based, tax-financed testing and screen-
ing program. The overall goal is to create new incentive structures
that motivate firms to produce the information necessary for toxics
assessment and make that information available to the public in an
accessible manner.
1. Mandatory disclosure.
Any information-based approach to toxics policy must be built
on a sophisticated and effective disclosure regime. Based on ex-
isting programs such as California's Proposition 65... and the
EPA's Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) , such a regime needs to
be mandatory and subject to stronger liability provisions-perhaps
akin to the liability rules existing under duty-to-warn theories in
tort or the disclosure obligations that support the modern regime
of securities regulation. Indeed, some commentators have argued
that the mandatory disclosure system underlying the federal securi-
ties laws and the regulatory authority vested in the SEC together
provide the most logical institutional vehicle for requiring broader
social and environmental disclosures by public companies."3 6 Ac-
334. Formally known as the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act, Pro-
position 65 was approved overwhelmingly by Califomia voters in 1986. Codified as
amended at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25,249.5-.13 (West 1999 & Supp. 2001).
335. Modeled on NewJersey's 1983 Worker and Community Right to Know Act, TRI
was passed in 1986 as part of the Superfund reauthorization amendments. The program is
formally known as the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, codified at
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11001-11050 (2001).
336. See Robert H. Feller, Environmental Disclosure and the Securities Laws, B.C. ENvrL.
AFF. L. REv. 225 (1995) (arguing for expanded environmental disclosures under the fed-
eral securities laws); Cynthia Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1197 (1999) (concluding that the SEC has the statu-
tory authority to require expanded social and environmental disclosures and that it should
use that authority to do so). In fact, as Williams points out, the SEC twice considered such
an expansion in the 1970s and 1980s (partially as a response to rulemaking petitions
brought by NRDC and other public interest groups) but "concluded that the information
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cording to Cynthia Williams, the "celebrated" financial trans-
parency of U.S. capital markets, which "derives primarily from the
specific information about operating results, presented using rigor-
ous accounting principles" as mandated by the federal securities
laws, provides a model for a broader social and environmental
transparency.3 37 Leaving aside the apparent shakiness of her pre-
mise regarding "rigorous" accounting practices in the wake of the
Enron scandal, it is not clear that the SEC and the financial disclo-
sure regime are the appropriate vehicles for a more formal ap-
proach to toxics disclosure. One would not expect lawyers and
accountants to have a comparative advantage over engineers and
environmental scientists regarding the presentation and release of
toxics information. But the general notion of mandatory disclo-
sure, backed up by strong liability rules for failure to disclose and
misrepresentation, does provide an important model.
In some respects, California's Proposition 65 comes closest to
such a liability rule in the toxics area. 3 ' Mandating that "[n] o per-
son in the course of doing business shall knowingly and intention-
ally expose any individual to a chemical known to the state to cause
cancer or reproductive toxicity without first giving a clear and rea-
sonable warning to such individual,"339 the law creates a strong
duty to warn. By providing for public and private enforcement, in-
cluding a "bounty-hunter's" provision that rewards successful plain-
tiffs with twenty-five percent of the penalties, 40 the law also creates
considerable incentives for individual firms to comply.
that an expanded disclosure mandate would require was not clearly significant ('material')
to investors." Id. at 1206.
337. See Williams, supra note 336, at 1200.
338. Proposition 65 contains both a warning requirement and a discharge prohibi-
don, but the centerpiece of the program has been the warning requirement. While much
of the commentary on the program has focused on the efficacy of the warning require-
ment, the key innovation of Proposition 65 might actually lie in the background liability
rule and the corresponding incentives it creates for firms to generate the information nec-
essary for toxicity testing. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warn-
ings Under California's Proposition 65, 23 EcoLoGY L.Q. 303 (1996); Michael Barsa,
Calfornias Proposition 65 and the Limits of Information Economics, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1223
(1997). For a discussion of the information-generating incentives embedded in proposi-
tion 65, see Roe & Pease, supra note 23.
339. CAL. HEALTH & SA=r- CODE § 25,249.6 (West 1999). Proposition 65 also prohib-
its the discharge or release of such chemicals "into water or onto or into land where such
chemical passes or probably will pass into any source of drinking water." Id. at § 25,249.5.
340. Public enforcement provisions are at CAL. HEALTH & SAFErv CODE § 25,249.7(c)
(West 1999 and Supp. 2001). The citizen suit provision, which authorizes any person to
bring an action "in the public interest," is at § 25,249.7(d). The bounty hunter provision is
at § 25,192 (2).
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In contrast to Proposition 65, TRI does not rely on the same
sort of background liability rule to mandate disclosure. The chief
advantage of this program lies instead in the incentives it creates
for performance monitoring and benchmarking through standard-
ization of toxics release data. 4' By providing a continuous stream
of standardized data that can be aggregated and compared within
and between sectors, TRI enriches the information base and allows
for performance monitoring among firms as well as by third party
actors.342
EPA's recent efforts to extend and enhance TRI through the
Sector Facility Indexing Project (SFIP)-a web-based project that
brings together TRI and other environmental information from a
number of data systems to produce facility-level profiles for five in-
dustry sectors (petroleum refining, iron and steel production, pri-
mary nonferrous metal refining and smelting, pulp manufacturing,
and automobile assembly) and a subset of major federal facilities-
represents an important next step in this evolving toxics disclosure
regime. As currently constituted, SFIP provides information on
production, compliance and inspection history, chemical releases
and spills, and demographics of the surrounding population."
While the program is limited in scope and voluntary, it could pro-
vide the basis for a new regime of environmental disclosure that is
linked to specific facilities. Making-it mandatory and creating a lia-
bility regime for misrepresentations or omissions (failure to warn)
would give it teeth.
2. Monitoring.
Monitoring and enforcement obviously provide essential com-
plements to any mandatory disclosure regime. Without effective
monitoring, the liability rules underlying mandatory disclosure
341. For a very favorable assessment of TRI and its potential to incentivize continuous
improvement in environmental performance, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as
Environmental Regulation, 89 GEo. LJ. 257 (2001). According to Karkkainen, TRI represents
a watershed in environmental regulation, "pioneering the systematic use of performance
monitoring and benchmarking as regulatory tools." Id. at 260. Although he points out the
current limits of the program, the incentive structure embedded in TRI holds considerable
promise: "TRI-generated transparency thus unleashes, strengthens, and exploits multiple
pressures, all tending to push in the direction of continuous improvement as facilities and
firms endeavor to leapfrog over their peers to receive credit for larger improvements or
superior performance" Id. at 262.
342. Id. at 261-62.
343. For information on the project and access to the data, see EPA's SFIP home
page at http://es.epa.gov/oeca/sfi/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2002).
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would have little bite. Under the existing framework, administra-
tive agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the plaintiffs
bar serve as the primary monitors of environmental performance.
As suggested above, TRI, SFIP, and other disclosure programs pro-
vide important sources of information that can be used to improve
such efforts by allowing for easier sector- and facility-based moni-
toring of environmental performance. By lowering the costs of
monitoring, such programs open up new opportunities for local
communities and other third party actors to get involved in the
process. 344
Rather than simply using TRI and/or SFIP data to assess envi-
ronmental performance, however, one of the major goals for im-
proved monitoring in the toxics area should be to develop
improved techniques and institutional capabilities that allow for
better real-time monitoring of toxic releases from industrial facili-
ties. By moving further "upstream" to monitor actual releases from
industrial facilities, such monitoring provides a possible check on
the reported releases mandated under the various disclosure re-
gimes discussed above. The financial, technical, and institutional
difficulties of such a monitoring program are considerable, very
likely requiring significant government involvement.
Such efforts, however, could be complemented by a coordi-
nated program that draws on third parties and local communiti6s
to do real-time environmental monitoring of individual facilities.
The growing popularity of citizen-based monitoring programs,
such as the "Bucket Brigades" pioneered in industrial communities
in California and now spreading to states such as Louisiana, pro-
vides a possible model. Using low-cost air sampling devices built
from plastic buckets, the bucket brigades suggest that local citizens
can and will monitor the environmental quality of their communi-
ties if given the opportunity.345 Dara O'Rourke and Greg Macey
344. According to Karkkainen, one of the most important and far-reaching effects of
TRI lies in its ability to lower the costs and barriers of accessing the information necessary
to do environmental monitoring. In his view, "The underlying genius of TRI... is that by
measuring and continuously tracking facility- and firm-level environmental performance by
using objective and comparable metrics, it creates a transparent and information-rich envi-
ronment, enabling monitoring and benchmarking by multiple actors-by managers and
directors, as well as by markets, communities, and the regulatory apparatus at all levels of
government." See Karkkainen, supra note 340, at 329.
345. See the "Bucket Brigade" webpage at http://www.bucketbrigade.org/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 23, 2002). See also Mike Dunne, Air Sampling Bucket Simple, Effective Tool For Envi-
ronmental Activists, STATE-TimEs MORNING ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 29, 2000, at
A10.
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suggest that this sort of program marks the emergence of a new
paradigm of "community environmental policing"-one that has
the potential to democratize and empower local communities in
their efforts to monitor and control the industrial landscapes that
they inhabit.346 While there are limits to how far such a program
can be extended as a basis for improved monitoring of industrial
facilities, they clearly represent important efforts to develop what
O'Rourke and Macey refer to as "new strategies for public partici-
pation in environmental regulation."347 Stronger financial support
from EPA and foundations could significantly expand such pro-
grams-enhancing stakeholder involvement and generating a sig-
nificant force for greater accountability regarding environmental
performance.
3. Testing and screening.
Any effective monitoring program presumes not only that ac-
tors will have both the necessary incentives and the capabilities to
monitor, but also that they have something to monitor. This last
presumption is somewhat problematic in the toxics area given the
pervasive state of ignorance regarding the toxicity of the vast ma-
jority of chemical compounds that confront people in their daily
lives. This suggests the need for more systematic testing and screen-
ing in order to develop a better knowledge base for the regulatory
system. The crucial challenge lies in shifting the burden of generat-
ing this information to industrial actors in a manner that creates
positive incentives for testing and screening. If accomplished, this
would represent a significant step toward developing a new frame-
work for controlling toxic harms-one which rewards knowledge
rather than ignorance.
One possibility for effecting such a transition involves the impo-
sition of tort liability for failure to develop and disclose the infor-
mation needed to assess the risks associated with potentially toxic
substances. Various commentators have argued in this context for
special rules that shift the burden of factual uncertainty to the de-
fendant manufacturer to prove that its products are not hazard-
ous.3 48 By creating a new "duty to test," such a rule would
346. See Darn O'Rourke & Greg Macey, Community Environmental Policing- Assess-
ing New Strategies of Public Participation in Environmental Regulation, MIT Department
of Urban Studies and Planning (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
347. Id.
348. Margaret Berger, for example, argues for abolishing the general causation re-
quirement as an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case in toxic torts (the crucial factor
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presumably incentivize firms to produce the information needed
to assess the safety of their industrial releases.
In contrast to tort-based approaches, others have argued for the
superiority of administrative approaches to the testing problem. 49
One possible (and partial) solution in this context involves a tax-
financed testing and screening program for industrial discharges.
Designed on a sector-specific basis and financed through taxes on
specific industrial inputs that are known precursors of toxic com-
pounds (e.g., chlorine, petroleum feedstocks, etc.), this would pro-
vide a fund for testing as well as incentives for firms to switch to
cleaner processes. Such a program would also allow individual
firms in sectors where the technology is fairly standardized to pool
their efforts while avoiding free-rider problems. In contrast to a
new liability rule, this would presumably allow for better coordina-
tion of efforts and better allocation of resources among priorities.
Of course, realizing any of these three design changes would
require a significant shift in the current political climate regarding
toxics regulation. Any discussion of the most effective institutional
framework for controlling toxic harms that ignores politics is un-
likely to be of much use. But the fact that each of these design
changes draws on existing efforts and ideas and would operate as a
complement to, rather than a substitute for, the existing system
suggests some degree of political feasibility. At the very least, think-
ing about how to scale these innovations, particularly those emerg-
that controls liability in her view) and replacing it with a new tort that would impose liabil-
ity in negligence for failure to develop and disclose the information that is needed to assess
serious latent risks. In her view this would shift the burden to corporations, creating strong
incentives for producing information rather than maintaining ignorance. See Berger, supra
note 299, at 2140-52. Similarly, Wendy Wagner has proposed adopting a presumption that
an insufficiently tested product caused the plaintiff's harm in the products liability context.
See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CoRNELt. L.
REV. 773 (1997). For a critique of these proposals, see Mark Geistfeld, Scientific Uncertainty
and Causation in Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. Ray. 1011, 1014 (2001) (arguing that there is no
need for new evidentiary rules in the products area because, "tort liability can be imposed
on product sellers for not adequately warning about the scientific evidence suggesting that
the product is carcinogenic [or harmful in some other way]"). In Geistfeld's view, the
evidentiary hurdles inherent in proving causation in these sorts of cases are only relevant at
the damages phase. Id. Geistfeld points out, however, that "[c] ases outside of the products
liability context require different analysis, because the hazardousness of the substance de-
termines the appropriateness of imposing any liability on the defendant." Id. In these kinds
of cases, he argues, it might be appropriate to relax the evidentiary requirements in the
face of scientific uncertainty. Id.
349. Geistfeld, for example, concludes that administrative regulations rather than
new tort liability rules are needed to solve the problem of inadequate information. See
Geistfeld, supra note 348, at 1036-37.
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ing out of local communities, to provide key components of a new
approach to toxic harms enhances the ongoing process of social
learning that is ultimately the most important element of any pol-
icy reform effort.
V. CONCLUSION
This essay has explored the limits of the contemporary legal
and institutional framework for regulating and remedying toxic
harms through an intensive case study of dioxin contamination in
the pulp and paper industry. If this case study demonstrates any-
thing, it is that the incentive structures embedded in the current
institutional system (both tort and regulation) need to be re-
oriented in a manner that facilitates the generation of useful infor-
mation regarding toxic harms without succumbing to the
paralyzing effects of scientific uncertainty. As illustrated by the case
study, a preoccupation with scientific uncertainty creates consider-
able opportunity for politicization and delay. In cases where there
is a potential for significant harm to human health and the envi-
ronment, such delay seems unwarranted, even irrational. As cur-
rently constituted, both the regulatory system (dominated as it is by
a risk assessment calculus and a preference for technological solu-
tions) and the tort system (which inevitably bogs down over the
scientific complexities associated with proving causation in toxics
cases) are only capable of a chemical-by-chemical approach to
toxic harms. Such an approach will never be adequate to deal with
the magnitude of the problem posed by toxic chemicals.
As a complement to the existing regime, this essay has pro-
posed three institutional design changes, each of which draws on
and extends existing innovations in the context of an emerging
information-based approach to toxics regulation and control. A
more sophisticated disclosure regime-drawing on EPA's Toxics
Release Inventory, California's Proposition 65, tort theories regard-
ing the duty to warn, and perhaps some of the liability provisions
regarding disclosure obligations in the securities area-could pro-
vide the basis for a new toxics policy founded on the basic princi-
ple of "right to know." Complementing this, an improved
monitoring regime focused on individual facilities that harnesses
the energies of third parties and local communities could provide
stronger accountability while enhancing stakeholder involvement.
Finally, a sector-based testing and screening program financed by
taxes on chlorine (or other inputs implicated in the generation of
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toxic by-products) would not only create incentives for developing
and operationalizing alternative production systems (and there are
already a number of commercially viable alternatives in place) but
would also provide a fund as well as a possible institutional mecha-
nism for individual firms to cooperate in a program aimed at solv-
ing the fundamental problem of toxic ignorance. Of course,
whether any of these design changes is adopted is ultimately a po-
litical question, and none of them deal with the enormously com-
plicated issue of compensation. What they do offer, however, are
the rudiments of a new framework that creates incentives for
knowledge generation and collective learning.
Looking back, one wonders what Rachel Carson would have
made of the whole issue. Certainly she would have recognized the
centrality of politics. Doubtless, too, she would have been quick to
condemn the bold pronouncements made by industry advocates to
challenge regulation-"little tranquilizing pills of half truth" she
called them.5 0 In her view, contamination of the environment with
toxic substances was an issue beyond compromise. Precaution
rather than risk management was the only sane response, especially
in the face of uncertainty. Indeed, the very fact that there were and
are uncertainties concerning the implications of toxic chemicals
for human health and the environment provided one more reason
why they should be eliminated altogether. There were and are al-
ways alternatives-other paths to follow. In Carson's own words:
The choice, after all, is ours to make. If, having endured much,
we have at last asserted our 'right to know,' and if, knowing, we
have concluded that we are being asked to take senseless and
frightening risks, then we should no longer accept the counsel of
those who tell us we must fill our world with poisonous chemicals;
we should look about and see what other course is open to us.
351
350. CARSON, supra note 1, at 13.
351. CARSON, supra note 1, at 277-78.
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